

JPRS 84453

30 September 1983

# Sub-Saharan Africa Report

No. 2853



FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

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STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF NATION NOTED

Bonn AFRIKA-POST in German Aug 83 pp 12-13

[Article by Wolfgang Hoepker: "Ethiopia--Increasing Dependence on Moscow?"]

[Text] In the multi-national state of Ethiopia there is talk about the unfinished revolution, the Soviets are pressing for a harder pace. But only the West can provide economically effective aid--a conflict for which no solution is in sight for the time being.

Barely 9 years ago after the overthrow of Emperor Haile Selassie in September 1974 and the proclamation of "Socialist Ethiopia", people in the multi-national state are still talking about the unfinished revolution. Chief of state Mengistu Haile-Mariam, who in a lengthy procedure fought his way to power leaving a wide trail of blood behind him, from the Provisional Military Council (Dergue) governing as a collective, is striving for an "Executive Committee" now comprising only 7 military officers, and thus for one-man rule.

Only with hesitation is Mengistu giving in to the demand of Soviet Union, posing as the protecting power, to establish at last a unity party on the East Bloc model, which forms the transition from socialism to communism. The plans for this are to be made by the "Commission for the Establishment of a Party of Workers", which goes under the name of "Copwe". The establishment of a kind of Ethiopian Communist Party is being promised for the 10th anniversary of the revolution in September 1984.

This supports the version that Mengistu in the last analysis remained a nationalist (with the claim of the Amhara to be the privileged caste of the country) and can be classified as a communist only in a limited way. But one should be careful with assessments of that sort. The endeavor of the military regime to maintain a certain autonomy vis-a-vis the Soviet tactic of embrace can be gathered from a variety of symptoms. But this is counterposed by a steadily growing pressure on the part of Moscow to bind the large, geostrategically so important country on the eastern flank of Africa firmly to the Soviet of influence.



## Almost Half of the Budget for Professional Army

That applies for the steadily growing influence on the government and administration with pressure for a total nationalization and collectivization of the economy. But the central power position of the Soviets lies in the military sphere. The struggle of the central government in Addis Ababa against centrifugal insurrection and secession movements in the outer provinces gave Moscow the chance to make itself felt with massive intervention as "guarantor of the unity of Ethiopia".

With Soviet weapons and more than 3,000 Soviet instructors, the Ethiopian army has become the largest military force of Black Africa. Today it numbers about 300,000 men, 100,000 of which though belong to a militia with little battle experience as yet. In addition, there are approximately 12,000 Cubans in the capacity of instructors of the domestic military forces and about 4,000 experts from the German Democratic Republic, which are specialized in the training of the police and the build-up of the state security apparatus (including the establishment of forced labor camps).

The horrendous costs of the professional army, which swallow nearly half of the state budget, have now led to the introduction of obligatory military service for all 18 to 30-year-olds. But the recruitment is proceeding only tediously. The obligatory service is unpopular and could--based on the experience in connection with the forced recruitment for the militia--even increase the influx to the guerilla formations.

Ethiopia's political security map is saturated with spots: With the operational areas of the guerilla movements in the norther provinces of Eritrea and Tigre, in the East in the Ogaden which borders on Somalia, and in Sidamo in the South. Of all the restless areas, the Red Sea province of Eritrea causes the greatest difficulties for the central government. To be sure, the war of secession which has been surging back and forth in the region for more than two decades has lost dynamism during the past 5 years, but strong forces of the Ethiopian army continue to be tied down there. The major offensive "Red Star", which was started at the beginning of 1982 in Eritrea, was a failure in spite of the advance planning by members of the Soviet general staff, in military terms the Eritrean-Ethiopian War has come to a standstill.

Promises on the part of the Amharic central government to grant the province certain rights of autonomy are half-hearted and vague, so that a political solution now the same as ever lies in the remote future. The 34 million inhabitants of Ethiopia (according to UNESCO estimates more than 40 million) are subdivided into 80 different national and language groups. A nationality law is in preparation. However, as can be presumed, it will bring a new division of the provinces, otherwise called the regions of today--and thus new conflict material with a stimulus for a permanent guerilla war. The politically dominant nation of the Amhara, which numbers only about 4 million people, is earnestly not willing to share the power position, in which they were confirmed by the Soviets, with other nationalities.

The large southern region of the Ogaden, which in the drawing of borders during colonial times at one time was added to the Ethiopian Empire, paid for its se-

cession attempt, carried out from Somalia, with a bitter defeat after the intervention of Cuban-Soviet formations in 1978. The Ogaden continues to be a crisis area, but at present it does not tie down larger units of the Ethiopian army.

The geostrategic significance of the Horn of Africa, where the cape route crosses the sea connection between the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea, gives a key position to Somalia even in the tenor of East-West relations. Within the framework of an extensive aid program, the Americans there are expanding the port at the Gulf of Aden and the airport of Berbera.

"Consume, But Not Produce. . ."

The Soviet Union holds the naval base of Aden in South Yemen vis-a-vis Berbera and has installed a drydock on the Dahlak Islands stretched out in front of Eritrea in the Red Sea, which in 1977, shortly before their exodus from Berbera in Somalia was hauled there by the Soviets. But thus far Mengistu has refused to turn over the Dahlak Archipelago to the Soviets as a naval base; larger logistic installations on the island group are out of the question. After their expulsion from Somalia and Egypt and after their being kicked out of the Sudan, the Soviets anyhow became cautious enough not to provoke the Amharic-Egyptian nationalism unduly.

Successes of the Ethiopian revolutionary regime in the literacy campaign cannot gloss over stagnation and set-backs in the economic reform. The replacement of encrusted structures indispensable land reform, in spite of amalgamation into cooperatives, has thus far changed little in the archaic utilization of the soil. After liberation from the bonds of feudalism, the farmers are not easily harnessed into a new collective system. The government complains about the lacking work morale of the farmers, "who want to consume, but not produce". The state farms, too, are showing low, rather retrogressive productivity, the farms which must, above all, feed the army. Ethiopia, where more than 90 percent of the population live in agriculture and, with a rudimentary infrastructure, industry has barely begun to develop, still is among the five or six poorest countries in the world.

Mengistu's appeal to the East Bloc to extend effective economic aid in addition to weapons and ideology has produced only meager results, exaggerated expectations of the "socialist fraternal countries" with respect to the economy and technical know-how were bitterly disappointed. In order to overcome its backwardness in terms of development, Ethiopia needs the assistance of the West, which for political reasons, however, is reticent with respect to credits. When applying to Western creditors--for example, to the World Bank and to the EEC countries--it is of positive importance that Ethiopia is regarded as a prompt payer and that the evil of corruption, otherwise rampant in Black Africa, has made only marginal inroads.

At least 80 percent of the commercial trade is being transacted with Western countries. The United States, which after the break of 1977-1978 is portrayed as Enemy Number One, is now as before the most important trading partner, in particular as importer of Ethiopian coffee. Against all curses of the East Bloc, the United Nations or the Organization of African Unity, Ethiopia is

also maintaining and cultivating a special relationship with Israel, which is manifested in the presence of an imposing corps of Israeli experts and advisers in the country. This engagement has something to do with Falashas (Jews) who have resided in Ethiopia since pre-Christian times and are estimated at approximately 50,000 today.

#### Contact With the West--In Moscow's Interest?

The Soviet Union, Cuba and Honecker's emissaries by no means feel as comfortable in Addis Ababa as it may appear on the outside. Under the surface of "monolithic unity" in the sense of the East Bloc doctrine, there are unmistakable attempts within the Ethiopian government to reestablish closer contact again with Western Europe and the United States. To be sure, the important question arises here whether such considerations in the final analysis do not also fit into the concept of the Soviet leadership. Moscow is evidently inclined to concede Western economic and development aid to its African clients, indeed even to favor it, but to keep intact the political and military ties.

8970

CSO: 3420/32



RURAL WATER SUPPLY PROJECT 'SIGNIFICANT' PART OF DEVELOPMENT

Banjul THE GAMBIA NEWS BULLETIN in English 31 Aug 83 pp 1, 2

[Excerpts] THE President, Sir Dawda Jawara has described the country's rural water supply project as a significant component of our development efforts in view of the recent Sahelian Drought.

Speaking at Munyagen in Jokadu District at the beginning of his seven-day provincial tour, he said that because of the drought, wells in various parts of the country become dry after the rains causing shortage of drinking water. Consequently the Rural Water Supply programme was launched in 1977.

Sir Dawda noted that 344 wells have so far been dug all over the country. This is one of 160 wells being dug under the German Rural Water Supply Project. he commended the West German government for financing the project and the German contractors; GITEC, for their solid construction work.

The President told the villagers that the method of construction being employed by GITEC would ensure that water is available throughout the year.

The Project Manager, Mr. H. Muenderlein disclosed that GITEC has employed 135 Gambians to help in its work.

Commenting on the complaint about the poor rains, the President stated that drought is not unusual in the Gambia as the last 12 years have shown. He said the country's goal is to attain food self sufficiency but efforts have been hampered by lack of rain. This is why the government has launched the Jahally - Pacharr Rice Development Project. Sir Dawda urged the farmers to follow the advice of the Department of Agriculture in order to improve both the quality and quantity of their produce.

At Njakunda, speakers at the meeting complained of shortage of water for both human and animal use and difficulty in obtaining rice. Again, the President reiterated his government's commitment to providing water for the rural areas and revealed that apart from the Rural Water Supply and the German Rural Water Supply Project, the Saudis were financing another project which will involve the sinking of 200 wells and 35 boreholes. He however, pointed out that wells or boreholes cannot be dug in every village so government has decided to locate them in big village which are far away from th river.

BRIEFS

**SUGAR PRICE INCREASE--**THE price of granulated Sugar has been revised upwards for the first time in 12 months. According to Ministry of Finance and Trade sources, the the increase is due to a corresponding rise in the World Market price of the commodity. The new prices which came into effect last Thursday are as follows: Wholesale price for 50 bags of 50 kilograms in zone one is D77; retail price per bag of 50 kilos is D81. In zone two, the price is D86.50, zone three D87; zone four D87.50. Retail per kilo in zone one is D1.80; zone two D1.92, zone three D1.95b and zone four D2.00. Retail per cup in zone one is 45 bututs, zone two 48 bututs; zone three 49 bututs and zone four 50 bututs. The Gambia Information News Services quotes the official sources as saying that even with this modest increase, the price in the Gambia of granulated sugar is the lowest in the sub-region. [Text] [Banjul THE GAMBIA NEWS BULLETIN in English 31 Aug 83 p 2]

CSO: 3400/1923

NEW IMPORT POLICY WILL BOOST REVENUE

Monrovia DAILY OBSERVER in English 29 Jul 83 pp 1, 10

[Article by Joseph Toe: "New Import Police Will Boost Revenue"]

[Text]

**Government revenue will get a boost of over half a million dollars yearly when the Commerce Ministry's recent decision of restricting imported commodities to local insurance coverage takes effect.**

The decision, which was announced on May 3 by the office of the Insurance Commissioner at the Commerce Ministry, has made the ministry the target of mounting criticism from the public and private sectors, as selling prices of imported items will be reportedly hiked by 4.5 per cent as a result of the new policy.

Managers of these insurance firms have said that the high insurance rates are due to the high risks and smaller market facilities in the country.

The Commissioner of Insurance, Mr. Benjamin T. Collins, said in an interview with our reporter yesterday that the new policy will not warrant any increase in the selling prices of imported consumer items on the local market.

He said the decision will cause an increase in the amount of premium taxes paid by insurance firms to government, adding that taxes paid by these insurance firms have been "far low" in previous years.

Mr. Collins noted that the move is not a complete contradiction of the Executive Directive to the Ministry of Commerce to stabilize the prices on local market.

He said the policy was enacted in direct response to Section 4.10 of the Insurance Law of Liberia, passed by the Legislature in 1976 for the economic emancipation of the country.

Due to the lack of logistics and personnel at the ministry to study the provision, he added, the law had not been enforced in the previous years.

In order to implement the insurance law, Commissioner Collins said, he had written the Finance Ministry's Customs Division to put goods entering the country, under local insurance coverage.

He said a reply from the Customs Division stated that they will not implement the decision unless a directive was given from high authorities of the Finance Ministry.

CSO: 3400/1920

CONSTRAINTS ON ENTREPRENEURSHIP DEVELOPMENT REVIEWED

Monrovia NEW LIBERIAN in English 21 Jul, 8 Aug 83

[Article by Dr. Brahima D. Kaba: "Problems of Liberian Businesses"]

[21 Jul 83 p 4]

[Excerpt]

REVIEW

In the present article, a review of some major problems faced by Liberians in business and/or desirous to enter formal trading is attempted.

The information reviewed was mostly obtained from the data contained in the data files of the members of the newly established Small and Medium Business Association of Liberia. Additional information was collected through informal discussions with other Liberians interested or engaged in business activities.

It is worth noting that nearly all the materials examined here concerns Liberian businessmen and women operating in or near the city of Monrovia. The lack of logistics

support accounts for such a heavy urban bias in the review.

DEFINITION

Like any other definition, the definition for a Liberian-owned Small Scale Business is at best arbitrary. For our purpose here and for the sake of conforming ourselves to standards set by Government Institutions, we shall use the definition of the National Investment Commission according to which a small scale enterprise is one with a maximum assets of \$50,000.00 while a medium scale enterprise is one with maximum fixed assets of \$100,000.00.

Of the estimated 7,000 Liberian-owned enterprises of all categories registered in



1982 at the Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Transportation, nearly 80% fall within the range of the N.I.C definition.

When, however, the definition of Small and Medium Business Association of Liberia is considered (enterprises with maximum fixed assets of over \$900,000.00) 95% of Liberian-owned businesses would qualify as small and medium scale businesses.

Our statistics also indicate that most non-Liberian-owned businesses are to be categorized as medium or larger scale enterprises or corporations.

The average Lebanese or Indian store operating in the commercial district of the city of Monrovia has estimated fixed assets of \$500,000 per year with investment in excess of \$500,000.00.

Interestingly, our data indicates that the ratio of fixed assets over total assets is larger for non-Liberian enterprises and corporations than for Liberian-owned small scale businesses.

This is because major domestic financial institutions which extended credit facilities consider larger

enterprises less risky than small trading firms.

There are many non-Liberian small and medium scale businesses which experience the same problems as Liberian-owned businesses.

## PROBLEMS

In the present context of business entrepreneurship development in Liberia, a problem shall mean anything that makes it difficult or impossi-

ble for an enterprise to establish or operate for a reasonable profit.

### DEPENDENCY MENTALITY

Liberia shares with the majority of developing countries the characteristics of a dependent and formally colonized society.

This global factor is in and by itself quite constraining on the mentality and sense of initiative of the would-be indigenous businessmen or women.

This macro perspective should be kept in mind in enumerating the other factors which constitute serious impediments to the establishment and development of a dynamic indigenous business sector in Liberia.

[Text] DISREGARD OF TRADE AND  
COMMERCE

For well established historical reasons such as mentioned above, Liberians in both the urbanized monetary as well as the agricultural subsistence sectors of the economy tend to completely ignore the crucial role that commerce and trade play in establishing and guaranteeing national independence and socio-economic development.

As an example, indigenous trade and commerce have been the key to the Japanese economic miracle despite and possibly because of, the fact that an important portion of financial capital was foreign, especially American.

The great majority of business people that we have so far approached seem not to realize that there is an important correlation between economic independence and a greater control of domestic trade and commerce by nationals.

A greater control by citizens over the country's commercial activities increase the chances of success for socio-economic development. Of course, other factors inter-

vene to influence this relationship.

The historical reasons which led to the non-committal attitude of Liberians to trading activities were motivated by political necessities such as the tendency of the dominant political group to establish a pattern of social relations which prevented and continues to prevent the development of indigenous trade as well as other essential productive sectors of the society.

However, presently, the emergence of new objective realities and conditions may motivate new socio-political necessities which in turn could transform the old pattern of social relations.

Such transformation will then bring a change in the attitude of Liberians and eventually make them to realize the importance of commerce and industry for the progress of their society.

ABSENCE OF INSTITUTIONS

Because Liberians have a negligent attitude toward commercial activities, the society, in turn has neglected to provide them with the appro-

prate mechanisms to educate and inform them about the importance of this vital sector of the economy.

Most of our respondents attach more importance to a political or high ranking civil servant position than to any level of business activities.

Our investigation, for example, revealed that there is a complete lack of a system of information on the various procedures to be followed in obtaining a Business Registration Certificate and Import Permit from the Ministry of Commerce, Business License from the Ministry of Finance, Health Certificate for certain commodities from the Ministry of Health, and the Fresh Food Permit from the Ministry of Agriculture, etc.

Most of our respondents could not differentiate between the renewal of a Business Certificate and the filing of their income tax with the Finance Ministry.

There also seems to be a total lack of coordination between the government Ministries and agencies concerned with the various aspects of trade and commerce. This adds to the conjunction in which Liberian busi-

nessmen and women find themselves in when it comes to applying for a loan at any of our indigenous or foreign banking institutions.

Nevertheless, as suggested earlier, the lack of coordination between the above mentioned agencies results, in the first place, from the general lack of interest on the part of the public in business activities.

There is an urgent need to establish systematic procedures for educating and informing the public about the various aspects and characteristics of the private sector and its importance in national development. One of the roles of SMRAL is to help perform such a task.

#### ABSENCE OF INDIGENOUS CAPITAL

The Japanese case mentioned earlier indicates that foreign capital was used mostly by the Japanese for internal capital accumulation.

In Liberia, the situation has been the opposite whereas the bulk of our meager internal capital resources has been controlled by non-Liberian entrepreneurs in accumulating profit which, more often than not, were not reinvested in the

economy but were rather expatriated.

The increasing control by foreign elements over internal capital accumulation has been shown to constitute an impediment to new job creations and at the same time, to increase unemployment rate and rural-urban migration.

In a free enterprise system, the underdevelopment of indigenous entrepreneurship frustrates the development of the country's productive forces, especially its labor force.

Apart from the multinational agricultural and mining concessions which invested sizeable amounts of foreign, non-domestic capital assets at the initial stage of their establishment in Liberia, there are few instances where larger foreign-owned businesses brought into the country the bulk of their present assets.

Most non-Liberians trading houses are characterized by their heavy reliance on internal capital formation starting generally as small companies and growing out of the reinvestments of domestically earned or loaned capital, they expand their activities to higher level.

OVERWHELMING 'YES' VOTE FOR REFERENDUM PREDICTED

Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 12 Sep 83 p 13

[Article by Marilyn Cohen]

[Text] NEARLY 45 percent of the people who took part in an opinion poll conducted for the Sunday newspaper, Rapport, said they would vote "yes" in the forthcoming referendum, while 20 percent said they would vote "no".

The poll, conducted by Mark en Meningsopnames on Rapport's behalf over the past ten days, surveyed the opinion of 1 500 people throughout the country. From the results obtained, Mark en Meningsopnames made certain suppositions and estimated the outcome of the referendum on November 2 would be 67,4 percent who would vote "yes" and 32,6 percent who would vote "no".

However, the newspaper warned that this was how voters felt now and said that in the next seven weeks to voting day, the position could change.

Those involved in the survey were asked 10 questions.

Only 1,9 percent had definitely made up their minds that they were not going to vote while 3,7 percent were "very unsure" whether or not to vote.

Some 44,7 percent said they would vote "yes" while 20 percent said they would vote "no".

Another 11,8 percent said they would definitely vote, and would "most probably" vote "yes" while 3,9 percent of those who would definitely vote would "most probably" vote "no".

Only a small percentage, 6,3 percent, who had decided to vote had not yet made up their minds.

Five percent said they had not yet decided whether to vote, but indicated that if they did, they would "probably" vote "yes". Another 2,8 percent said they would "probably" vote "no" should they vote at all.

Many more of the Afrikaans speakers (50 percent) who took part in the survey said they would "definitely vote yes" compared to the English speaking voters (37 percent) with the same views.



However, there was virtually no difference between the two language groups when it came to voting "no". Some 20 percent of both the English and Afrikaans speakers in the survey said they would "definitely vote no".

The differences between the supporters of the various political parties was clearly reflected in the poll.

Of the Progressive Federal Party supporters, 36 percent said they would vote "yes"; 43 percent said they would vote "no" while about 20 percent were unsure of how they would vote.

Among the National Party supporters, 84,7 percent will vote "yes" and 4,8 percent "no".

Seventy percent of the New Republic Party supporters will vote "yes" and 22,5 percent, "no".

Of the Conservative Party supporters, 8,4 percent will vote "yes", 79,4 percent will vote "no" and 12,3 percent are still unsure.

Among the Herstigte Nasionale Party supporters, 5,4 percent will vote "yes", 70,4 percent will vote "no" and 24,3 percent are unsure how they will vote.

The strongest "yes" vote will come from the Cape (77 percent of voters there) followed by the Free State with 73 percent; Natal with 70 percent and the Transvaal with 61 percent.

CSO: 3400/1918

COMMENTS ON U.S. REACTION TO MUGABE

MB201854 Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 17 Sep 83 p 5

[Editorial: "U.S. Is Blind"]

[Text] "Any old excuse will do. We are young," Dr Mugabe says before leaving Washington after his talks with President Reagan. "We may make mistakes as we move forward, but we are prepared that where we err, we shall correct ourselves and get back to course."

Tortures, redetentions after acquittals, the massacre of hundreds of Ndebele, a reduction of standards of medical services and of education, the move towards a one-party state, the erosion of confidence that causes whites to leave in droves.

Nothing to worry about.

Just the teething troubles of a young state. Or so Mr Mugabe would have the Americans believe. And, funnily enough, they'll swallow anything that comes from a black prime minister.

Even if he is an ex-terrorist leader with the blood of countless innocents on his hands.

Even if, behind his unctuous smile, lies a ruthless Marxist dictator-to-be.

The fact that his government rearrested the six airmen who were acquitted in the Thornhill sabotage case caused only the mildest of tut-tuts in Washington.

Senior Reagan officials said merely they were "troubled by the redetentions."

The fact that there have been gross violations of human rights in Zimbabwe also does not seem to have worried the Reagan administration.

Assurances by Mr Mugabe that the country "is still committed to democracy and the rule of law" have been "well received," although they amount to nothing more than empty phrases.

The fact that Zimbabwe abstained from voting against the Soviet Union in the UN Security Council debate on the shooting down of the South Korean airliner with the loss of 269 lives didn't make the U.S. rethink its attitude towards Mr Mugabe.

One might have expected that Mr Mugabe's reluctance to condemn Russia on a matter so outrageous as the airliner massacre would have indicated that he was far from the ally the U.S. deserves.

Especially as it is providing Zimbabwe with handsome financial aid (presently amounting to R78-million a year).

But Washington seems to have forgotten that Mr Mugabe is a Marxist and isn't going to change into a "democrat" simply by saying he is one.

And he is certainly not going to side openly against the Soviet Union when it is unfashionable among Marxists to do so.

Even the latest outburst by that non-observer of legal niceties, Dr Hubert Ushewokunze, will not worry the Americans.

In a stormy debate over the redetention of the airmen, the infamous Dr Ushewokunze shouted, "You are sick in the head," when a white MP said the remaining three officers should be freed and given compensation and their pension.

When another MP said individual justice was a prerequisite for being civilised, Dr Ushewokunze shouted: "To hell with it."

But then the bland assurances about the role of law by Mr Mugabe will be accepted without question because the Americans would like to believe that Dr Ushewokunze is just showing the boisterousness of a minister in a young state that still has to find its feet.

Even when Mr Mugabe finally declares a one-party state the United States will still be laying out the red carpet for him.

The trouble is that there are none so blind as those who do not see what is really happening in Zimbabwe.

And America, for its own purposes, and because of the pressures of its black lobby, is truly blind.

CSO: 3400/1936

## DEFENSE OF SADF PROFESSIONALISM OFFERED

Johannesburg FRONTLINE in English Sep 83 pp 22-23

[Article by David Williams: "The Politics of Soldiery"]

[Text]

**E**NGLISH-speaking South Africans tend to have an aversion to a career in the armed services – as well as to the Civil Service generally. Teachers do as much as anyone to form the character of a person, yet they are treated condescendingly; engine drivers hold immensely responsible positions, yet are regarded as menials; postmen are sneered at, but without them civilised communication would be almost impossible.

This superior attitude is understandable: public service jobs are often restricting to the imagination, and usually badly paid. Far better to hope that one's child will be a doctor or a lawyer, a "professional". It's just as reasonable to avoid a career in the police or the prisons, if only because of a fastidious desire not to get dirty hands by dealing with the seamier elements of society.

None of these objections should in theory apply to a military career – except perhaps the salary conditions. The professional soldier is offered the possibility of variation, excitement, responsibility, and leadership. Although he must be temperamentally suited to fitting into a fairly rigid structure, to obeying the orders of others and conveying his own to those below him, this brake on individuality is also found in most private sector organisations. There, seniority and the need for obedience may be determined with more subtlety, but often too with more inflexibility and less security.

But as far as English-speaking South Africans are concerned, there's simply no comparison between the Colonel and the

Company Chairman. This is difficult to understand in some ways. Our military and business practice is directly based on the British model. Among the British elite, a graduation from Sandhurst and a spell in the Regular Army is still a recommendation rather than a disadvantage, and the cross-pollination between the Forces, Oxbridge, and the City continues. This is definitely not the case in South Africa, despite the many ostensible similarities: our Defence Force structure is virtually identical, although the names of some ranks are different. There is the equivalent ceremonial element: for the Black Watch and the Green Howards, read Transvaal Scottish, Prince Alfred's Guard, and the Natal Carbineers – each with a fierce regimental tradition going back to the 19th Century.

From the business side, one would expect senior soldiers to be welcomed into the private sector, which could benefit greatly from their experience of organisational and leadership challenges. It doesn't happen often.

Why the mutual isolation? One reason is that the wheel of language dominance has turned full circle since the days of Empire and Dominion. Afrikaners run the Civil Service, and dominate its day-to-day ethos. Thus the Army tends to give commands in Afrikaans, although there is technically a strict language equality. This is simply convenient, particularly on active service when hesitant confusion must be avoided. But English-speakers are easily put off and feel prejudiced by what is a practical necessity, especially

when exposed to it during National Service. Your average "soutie" has a wary attitude when he does his two years; he tends to distance himself from the corporals and lieutenants who run his life, defending himself with cynicism and wry mockery. To him, the "PF" is an eccentric creature at best, and a crude power maniac at worst: it's incomprehensible that anyone should want to be in uniform for life!

Then there is the political factor. It's widely held among the English intellectual elite that the Defence Force is the military arm of the National Party. Military actions such as the raid on Maputo and incursions into Angola are criticised on political grounds, and those voluntarily in uniform are especially identified with such actions. This is not fair: firstly because there is no proof that the Defence Force has chosen to follow a particular political policy. It may *seem* to do so, but there is an inevitable blurring between grand political strategy and particular military tactics. The Defence Force is there to implement the foreign policy of the government of the day; if it did not, it would be open to accusations of inefficiency, mutiny, and corruption.

The fact that the same party has been in power for 35 years makes the whole thing more suspicious, and if the Government *has* appointed its generals for political reasons, it may still have cause to regret it: the National Party government may yet have to depend on the professional loyalty of officers who political affiliation is now with the CP or HNP. But unless and until the Officer Corps is put to that test it is unreasonable to make assumptions about its political bias one way or the other.

Secondly it is not fair to assume that a career soldier is spiritually a party to all the orders he is given. Occasionally, a professional soldier has to obey orders which he himself would not have given – if he did not, though, order itself would break down, and the country would have no defences. Military neutrality is essential when the wind changes, and no-one ever knows when that will happen. The Zimbabwe experience is instructive here – who would have thought that General Walls could have stayed on for as long as he did after Independence, that the Whites there would have turned desperately to him, rather than Ian Smith, for reassurance? There was some instinctive

recognition that Walls was above politics, and therefore the only prominent white who could change sides without betraying any cause. Walls' own subsequent actions are irrelevant – what is important is the way his position was perceived.

For the professional soldier the regiment is more important than the party, if he supports one at all. The SADF will serve the country well only to the extent to which its leaders subscribe to that ethos. It would appear that many English-speaking PFs do just that. They make up a surprisingly high proportion of the officer strength in the Navy and the Air Force. Both are services where the strength is based more on tradition and unit pride than in the Army, where the lethargy of National Service has a destructive effect by sheer force of numbers.

The English-speaking officers have gone against a trend in their background, and in some cases friends and even family are highly critical. Yet there's another British tradition which lends itself to an interest in regiments and "comradeship" – it's still found in the older schools. This is the moulding force of The House. Team spirit, a sense of honour and the values of compromise and independent judgement which come from living together in relatively Spartan conditions away from home. The link between the House and the Regiment is firm – each provides order and discipline, and a clear system of leadership. This can be appealing to the talented and ambitious who wish to serve, and not only to the emotionally immature who cannot cope without the structure.

**T**he road from British public school to Sandhurst is an easy one, and many scholar-generals have travelled it – Wavell and Auchinleck combined the refined sensibility of the poet with the rugged realism needed in a commander. They could easily have been pacifists, but knew that war will never go away. They responded to the call of military strategy as a means of maintaining peace.

The most successful general is the one who manages to deploy his forces and resources in such a way as to prevent war. This is the thinking behind our own generals' belief that the solution to the



country's problems is 80 per cent political. The fact that their tactics against the present perceived enemy are offensive does not contradict this: tactically, the soundest defence is through attack. The validity of the

political policy is another matter, and should be criticised separately. The line between tactics and grand strategy is often blurred, but it should be made a lot clearer to the public than it is: here, the Defence Force is too secretive. If, on the other hand, its orientation *is* political, it will have a lot to answer for.

The background and education of many English-speaking men would lend force to the concept of military neutrality, and to the acceptability of a military career which is taken for the best of reasons — service. Their absence, particularly from the Army, leaves it open to the control of those whose breeding is perhaps more conducive to political bias.

To keep one's distance on principle may well be justified; but one wonders if this is not sometimes a sloppy excuse for the English-speaker to keep away from public service. In so many other fields, compromise is also demanded. Every South African opponent of the existing structure compromises with it every day of his life. There's little justice in regarding the professional soldier as more odious just because he puts a second uniform over his white skin.

At least some of the hope for the future may rest on his creativity and neutrality in a job which is crucial to any country's stability. ●

CSO: 3400/1893

# ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL REFORMS GIVEN

Johannesburg FRONTLINE in English Sep 83 pp 37-39

[Article by Brian Pottinger: "All That's Certain Is That It Cannot Last"]

[Text]

**E**VEN eight years ago it was so simple. Whites held all political power, coloureds and Indians were in a sort of never-never advisory limbo and blacks of course had all they needed with rights in their "homelands".

Then those unpleasant realities of political and economic life began to catch up. South Africa's booming economy called for more skilled people than whites could provide, increasing resistance internally and threats externally demanded more soldiers and a better educated generation of young blacks began telling the Government precisely where to get off.

Enter the Erika Theron Commission and the beginning of a bumpy process of constitutional change thrashed out in National Party think-tanks, caucuses, congresses, fireside chats with coloured and Indian leaders and a massive quasi-commission called the President's Council that ate up millions of rands and, not surprisingly, spat out a constitutional plan near as damn to the one the Government had in mind all along.

Emerges the Republic of South Africa Constitution Bill No. 91 of 1983 which, briefly put, seeks to bring coloureds and Indians politically onside with whites but in a reserve position.

The black population of South Africa is totally excluded from the provisions of the bill, the coloured leaders who precipitously proclaimed their intention to take part in the new deal have pledged to bring in black people (which given the logic of the Constitution would automatically entail its destruction) and, finally,

whites are split down the middle.

In sum, the constitution has been launched with some 91 per cent of the people who will be directly affected by its provisions hostile, excluded or openly committed to destroying it.

Ah but, say the Bill's protagonists, once the system is in operation it will develop consensus among the players. Will it?

Possibilities for consensus with black South Africans *within* the proposed constitution is by definition ruled out. The existing constitution is colour conscious only to the extent that it insists whites alone can be representatives in Parliament. On who can vote for those representatives it is silent (that is determined by a law).

The new constitution, however, says quite clearly that blacks will be excluded altogether. If they want to take part in the central constitutional processes (as distinct from the homeland variety) their only option is to work actively for the end of the constitution. And once a big chunk of the public feels forced to destroy such an important symbol of the state it spells bad news for other equally vital symbols, including Law itself.

What about consensus with coloureds and Indians?

Herein lies one of the great ironies of the Constitution Bill for the very points of deepest contention between the white and coloured-Indian communities - Group Areas Act, Population Registration and Separate Amenities - are not only "non-negotiables" in terms of NP policy but fundamental to the operation of the

proposed Constitution.

Either the National Party or the coloured and Indian communities must renounce their most deeply held convictions. Failing that unlikely event genuine consensus between the communities as distinct from palliness between putative leaders cannot, by definition, be reached within the structure of the proposed constitution or in the processes it is supposed to catalyse.

Here are some of the other paradoxes in the Bill. Reform in South Africa is presented by the Government in terms of moving away from race discrimination; yet this "reformist" constitution for the first time actually entrenches racism on a 4:2:1 ratio purely on the basis of colour and not group (there is no talk of an "English chamber".)

Again, the whole Bill is structured so that separate racial communities have a say in "own" affairs but an annexured list reveals "own" affairs to be marginal and highly qualified portfolios; rather like designing an entire house to maximise warmth in a climate that gets cold only one day a year.

Paradox Three; Government fiercely punts the view that the new constitution will move away from the present Westminster "Winner Take All" system where the party which can claim a majority of just one in Parliament runs the whole show.

But under the new system the party that can claim a majority of only one in the white chamber rules; dominates the electoral college that elects the President and through him nominates the cabinet and loads the President's Council.

Another paradox. After an agonising internal dispute the National Party finally concedes the bill does amount to power-sharing. But does it? Does it hand minorities like the coloured and Indian communities real bargaining chips?

In regard to the minor "own" affairs the various chambers undoubtedly have effective power in the same way the old Coloured Persons Representative Council had power over some domestic matters.

But in common matters affecting all three chambers white domination studs the constitution from top to bottom. The executive president's powers together with those of his loaded President's Council can virtually sweep all before them if one chamber chooses to be recalcitrant about budgets or laws.

The legislature's powers are further curtailed by the fact that new laws and the scrapping of old ones can only be initiated by the cabinet. This means that no matter what the coloured chamber may feel about, say, the Group Areas Act it cannot initiate a law to repeal it.

If the minority chambers get miffed with the whole process they cannot even collapse the edifice *a la* CRC. The constitution allows the President to set whatever quorums he likes for the chambers so that if only two people grace the benches it will be enough to keep the show on the road.

In the executive branch the constitution does allow the President to nominate coloureds or Indians as ministers or deputies who will, naturally, have authority over their departments and can initiate legislation. In reformist terms that's perhaps a step forward but is still subject to the largesse of the inevitably white President who is unlikely to hand over "sensitive" portfolios.

Sharing in the process of decision-making, maybe. But actually sharing in power – that's putting it a bit strongly.

The last and perhaps crucial paradox. The new constitution is hailed as a step forward because it increases "democracy" by bringing in coloureds and Indians thus broadening the popular base of the constitution.

The glaring weakness in the argument is the enormous cost at which "democracy" has been broadened; the creation of an autocratic presidency – "dictatorial" is perhaps too extravagant a term although the distinction between the two will depend more on the personality of the incumbent than the wording of the bill.

The new president will combine the offices of the present Prime Minister and the State President and be elected by an electoral college dominated by 50 whites from the majority party in Parliament. His proposed powers are considerable; dissolve Parliament, proclaim martial law, decide what is "own" and "common" affairs and approve all bills before they become law. Laws passed by Parliament and approved by the President and Parliament cannot be tested by an independent judiciary and his actions are not constrained by a Bill of rights protecting the individual (the Government argues the individual is protected through the safeguards extended to the group to which the individual belongs).

Now it is probably true that the powers of the proposed new president do not exceed by much the powers held separately by the present Prime Minister and the State President. It can also be argued that under the present system it is only a small coterie of people – the NP Parliamentary caucus – who actually elect the Prime Minister.

But there are important differences. Under the present system the PM remains subject to the will of this caucus; if P.W. Botha were to have a rush of blood to the head and declare himself a communist he would be given short shrift by his caucus as leader of the majority party in Parliament and as Prime Minister. Under the proposed new dispensation he cannot be touched for the five years of office unless he is proved to be corrupt or mad.

Wide agreement therefore exists that the structure of the bill is at best imperfect and at worst downright dangerous. But against this it is argued that the Bill itself is only a stage in a constitutional progression, a starting point which, once underway, will lead to further adaptation and "reform". The impetus created by having Indians and coloureds participating in the decision-making process (however imperfect initially) will force the President into compromise and consensus-finding; a walk-out by the coloureds and Indians will not destroy the system *structurally* but would cripple it *politically*. And while this consensus-seeking is underway white right-wing fears of being politically swamped can be allayed by pointing out that power remains firmly in the guiding hands of whites. But at the same time the new President's greater field of manoeuvre could allow him to take reformist steps which as a Prime Minister bound to a conservative caucus he could not have dared. In that way, the line runs, an orderly constitutional process is possible.

The problem with this argument is that the first casualty in a genuine "finding" of each other by whites, coloureds and Indians would have to be the apartheid constitution itself. The most basic contradictions between what coloureds and Indians want and the Government would be prepared to give is enough to tear the system apart.

Another school of thought warns that the exclusion of blacks could herald the end rather than the beginning of any hope of constitutional advance. The ir-

reconcilable differences of interest between what is a racist party-political constitution and the other actors – opposition whites, coloureds and Indians – will inevitably mean the early destruction of the constitution, they argue. In the maelstrom of the collapse, black fury, white reformist despair, and right-wing militancy will heighten risks of the political process spinning out of control thereby destroying, perhaps forever, the search for a genuine reformist constitution based on consensus. Constitutional processes which founder in Third World countries because of a lack of legitimacy have an unfortunate habit of giving a bad name to constitutional government as a whole for some time afterwards. Even the prospects of having a "liberaliser" as President do not outweigh the immense dangers of unfettered presidential rule – what happens, after all, if Andries Treurnicht becomes President?

The danger with this argument is that taken to its ultimate conclusion it prices one right out of the political game-play and into the frustrating limbo of protest politics and boycott strategies.

The two schools of thought reflect differing concerns; the one (the reform element within the NP) believes the greatest threat is white right-wing resistance and the other (broadly the PFP argument) sees an equal danger in frustrating legitimate black demands. The one believes a constitution should be an *instrument* for finding and advancing consensus and the other holds it should first be a *product* of consensus.

Tied to this is the scrap about whether one should participate in the new constitutional set-up or not. The opposition purists would argue that participation is contamination while the pragmatists claim that no matter what *intentions* the Government has about maintaining perpetual white baasskap (and the indications are that this hope is not a thousand miles from their thoughts) the *dynamics* of the situation will force them willy-nilly into a process of genuine reform.

Ultimately of course the answer depends on what the National Party chooses to do after the constitution's crash. Already in certain NP ranks come grim warnings that if the system does not get off the ground because of "sabotage" by the other players, the Government will adopt a "plague on all your houses" approach. Continues the era of futile crisis management, escalating violence

and increased militarisation of both domestic and foreign policy. Amid the dashed expectations and bloodshed it will become academic to argue who is responsible; the Government for originally railroading through a fatally flawed constitution or its opponents for refusing to play ball with a biased referee in the hope of changing the rules.

Maybe the only hope supporters of genuine reform can reasonably nourish when observing the mish-mash that is the Bill and the arrogance that was the process giving birth to it, is that when the crash comes the Government will be forced to admit it has crossed its constitutional Rubicon. Perhaps at that point it will have the courage to take its "reform" initiative back to the drawing board and, more hopefully, to the conference table. And maybe then all the anger and energy will not have been in vain. ●

CSO: 3400/1893



## 'ANTI-SOUTH AFRICA ELEMENT' EXAMINED

Johannesburg FRONTLINE in English Sep 83 p 54

[Text] What exactly is the "anti-South Africa element"? as referred to ad nauseum by sports administrators, leader writers, etc. Actually there's no such thing. No body of opinion anywhere is "anti-South Africa". There may be a few nutcases who are anti-South Africa because they're jealous of the beaches or some such. But that's about all. In some circumstances it is rational to talk about being "anti" a nation. The British were anti-Argentina during the Falklands spat, and vice versa. But "anti-South Africa" is nonsense.

At best it means anti the current structure of minority domination. Sometimes, quite often in fact, the people who are most anti that are actually South Africa's best friends. They're the people - true, not always - who are making honest efforts to divert us from our dead end path and avoid seeing us descend into a cataclysmic bust-up. After all, most of the more significant proponents of boycotts etc. are people who would actually like to see South Africa continue to operate in the western environment, with a free enterprise system, and western style civil liberties and democracy, and their argument is that boycotts and other uncomfortable but peaceable means of

persuasion might just force us into making the kind of changes necessary for this to happen. Whereas if it finally does come to the bust-up, the almost certain end result will be a dictatorial left-wing tyranny.

Perhaps we need to revise our terms. In the interest of accurate terminology Frontline cordially suggests to the SABC, The Citizen, and all them other commentators who are constantly reviling the "anti-South Africa element" that they hereinafter refer instead to "far-sighted elements abroad who are interested in peace and prosperity in South Africa".

Actually, there's quite a contradiction involved in much of this "anti-South Africa" thing. On the one hand, it's altogether the done thing nowadays for everybody to be running around saying how the reason the boycotts are wrong is because cultural and sporting contact *promotes change* in South Africa. So they want "change". Ah, fine. But then in the next breath they say that those who don't believe it creates enough change are "anti-South Africa". Are they perhaps seeing South Africa and apartheid as one and the same thing? ●

CSO: 3400/1893

DR SHLOMO PEER TO DEVOTE MORE TIME TO NP

Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 12 Sep 83 p 13

[Text] THE deputy chairman of Anglo American Life, Dr. Shlomo Peer is to take early retirement at the end of the year to be able to devote more time to politics and the National Party.

"I am rearranging my priorities," Dr Peer (57) said yesterday. "I decided that while I'm still relatively young and fit, to do the things which are important to me because if I wait until I am older, there will be no time".

However, Dr Peer has not set his sights on a seat in parliament. On the contrary, "I am a great believer in working at grassroots level and anyway I believe younger people should enter parliament".

His work at "grassroots level" led to the establishment of a National Party branch in the traditionally "safe" Progressive Federal Party seat of Houghton 15 months ago and more recently to the establishment of NP branches in Norwood and Kew. There are nearly 500 NP members in the three branches.

He is Divisional Chairman of the Houghton constituency, and as such serves on the NP's Transvaal head committee.

However, Dr Peer feels that he has not been able to devote as much time as he would have liked to his political activities. "When you are in full-time employment, your movements and time are restricted," he said. Despite his decision to take early retirement, he will remain close to the life assurance industry.

He is to be a consultant for Anglo American Life for the next five years (part of his retirement agreement) and will remain chairman of African Life, a company in the Anglo group, operating mainly in the Black market where, according to Dr Peer, there is a lot of potential for the future.

Satbel Group

In addition, he will continue to represent AA Life in the Satbel group which is controlled by Federale Volksbeleggings but in which AA Life has over 30 percent interest.

Dr Peer has been associated with the NP since 1976 and was a member of the Bezuidenhout branch until the formation of the Houghton branch.

The reception of an NP branch in Houghton has been reasonable, Dr Peer said. "We have put up tables to register voters at various points and although I expected a degree of antagonism, it was not forthcoming.

"I expect we will best be able to judge the feelings of the people when we hold our first public meeting on September 21 which will be devoted to the referendum".

CSO: 3400/1918

## INCREASING APPEARANCE OF 'LITTLE PRESS' REPORTED

Johannesburg FRONTLINE in English Sep 83 pp 17-19

[Article by Helen Zille: "The 'Little Press' Flexes Its Muscles"]

[Text] *Miley: Ek sê bra, kan dji vi' my sê waa die toilets is?*  
*Stranger: Naai man, ek soek oek self na 'n toilet.*  
*Miley: Dan kan os twie mos somma saam soek. By the way, my naam is Miley.*  
*Stranger: My naam is Johannes, but dji kan somma vi' my Jonnie noem want Johannes is 'n boere-naam dji sien.*

**T**HESE are the opening lines of a one-page play in the arts section of a publication grandly titled "The People's Voice" (Volume 1 No. 2). The dialogue between Miley and Jonnie unfolds as they look for a toilet in the city centre. Miley is out of work so he can only do "window shopping". What's more, the price of a single "button" (a mandrax tablet) is now R12.

The stage directions tell you in italics that they eventually find a toilet but "unfortunately" it has a "witvel" coming out of it.

The Witvel speaks the next line warning the two: "Dis Whites only" and threatens to call the police if they enter.

The two walk on, sharing philosophical insights about the common nature of human biological functions.

"Check net, né, dis os land, maa os het nie eens 'n public toilet hie nie," observes Miley.

Jonnie comes up with the solution: "Nou os water dan mas hulle boeme nat."

The stage directions explain that the two position themselves next to a tree at the roadside and do the necessary. They walk on relieved and manage to turn their

minds to other matters. Jonnie suggests that Miley try to find a job at the "Hypermarket".

Miley has the final word: Naai das exploit die boere 'n man te veel, but as daa "Non White" toilet is, sal ek gaan try.

"The People's Voice" is the publication of the Bishop Lavis Action Committee, commonly called BLAC. Apart from an Arts page, it has an editorial that assures people that "Electricity is a right not a privilege" and a letters page in which all three letters urge readers to "Reject PC" – as the President's Council's constitutional proposals are known. There is a profile of one "M.L. King" who is described as a "civic leader" from Atlanta Georgia. "Susy se hoekie" has recipe and beauty tips for women, and a homemade Crossword puzzle makes its point through clues like

4 Across: "Donald Woods had to ... out of S.A. to escape the police in 1977" and 12 down: "During 1976 the ... shot many children."

"The People's Voice" is a particularly lively example of the many small, localised newsletters that have sprung up all over the Cape Flats over the past years.

They are the visible signs of a political phenomenon that took root in the aftermath of the unrest and repression of the late 1970's. It was a time of reassessment and consolidation, when activists had to face the fact that much of the militant energy generated in 1976 had evaporated in white heat because there were no organisations or structures through which it could be channelled to achieve concrete political gains.

The black consciousness organisations had never broken through to a mass base, remaining for the most part the preserves of professionals and intellectuals. And when these organisations were banned in 1977 activists faced another reality: alternative forms of mobilisation would have to be found that could survive State repression.

The emphasis switched from national, high-profile, militantly political campaigns towards the face-to-face brand of local politics, organising people around concrete issues affecting their daily lives. Thus the "Civic movement" was born, first in Cape Town, and then in all other major centres, focussing on washing lines, bus shelters and electricity instead of abstract political principles.

"Die Council vat ons rent. Hulle moet die huise maintain" was the kind of slogan that stood a better chance of awakening an interest in Mrs Adams of Bonteheuwel (and a response from the Divisional Council) than "One Azania one Nation".

And it wasn't long before people realised: Local battles need local communications. The mobilisation of the community could only succeed if campaigns received publicity beyond the small human energy pool that launched them. The daily and weekly Press gave scant coverage. For the most part, they didn't spot the trend – but then, after all, how many readers would be interested in the campaign to get a bus shelter at the Buck Road terminus?

So, the community press was born to fill the gap. It comprises scores of publications, ranging from pamphlets to smart tabloids put out by various "civics" and organisations, passing the message to a limited readership in a small area: "We live here. Dig where you stand. Our locality is our power base."

At one remove are the bigger community papers serving wider areas, pioneered by Cape Town's *Grassroots*, which was launched in 1980. About 20 000 copies are distributed every five weeks – the minimum interval needed to avoid the prohibitive R40 000 registration fee.

*Grassroots* has been followed in other major centres by newsletters with equally evocative names: *The Eye* in Pretoria, *Ukusa* (meaning Dawn) in Durban, *Speak* in Johannesburg. But the best name belongs to Port Elizabeth's fledgling *Umthonyama* – a Xhosa word used to

describe the first dung on the ground in a new cattle kraal. "That word is the Xhosa equivalent of *Grassroots*" explains an Umthonyama organiser.

Their circulations range from about 2 000 to 10 000 and they come out at various levels of regularity, when finances and the time of volunteers makes the next issue a practical possibility.

**T**he growth of local community Press was paralleled by similar changes in the provocation lampooning style of the student press – a medium that had become synonymous with that notorious toddler who once appeared looking down a toilet bowl saying: "Excuse me, are you the Prime Minister". The national furore that followed convinced students that even if they regarded their publications as something of an adolescent joke, others didn't. If they were going to incur the wrath of the authorities it might as well be for something worthwhile.

In the years that followed the idea of establishing an alternative national newspaper was conceived and launched through the South African Student Press Union. "SASPU National" set out to become an alternative medium to what radical students pejoratively call the "commercial press". But their goal of presenting South Africa with the "other news" had to be modified as it came up against the hard reality of a lack of resources, manpower, community links and readers. Today the paper, and its smaller, quarterly sister, SASPU Focus, aim more modestly to be national student newspapers. And in that capacity, they form the second pillar of the alternative press.

So what qualifies these papers for the title "alternative?"

Firstly, they begin from the premise that racial conflict is merely a convenient camouflage for the real divide in South Africa: the class struggle.

They see themselves as part of that struggle, harnessing the motor of history to "organise, mobilise and educate" their readers.

They reject the view that newspapers can or should attempt to be "objective". Umthonyama put it this way in a recent editorial: "The papers of the rich have a tendency to claim reporting objectively, without taking sides. Nothing could be further from the truth. A newspaper is written by men and women. These men



and women will interpret things in a manner that will please the owners of these papers, the rich. No newspaper can claim to be non-partisan. It must take sides. Our people's paper pledges absolute loyalty to the people."

In practice, this rather amorphous category called "the people" refers to organisations that qualify for the title "progressive" — a synonym for "socialist". The relationship is symbiotic: community papers and organisations are vital life support systems for each other.

The community press is constitutionally controlled by representatives of various organisations who contribute most articles, distribute the paper, and vote for its office bearers at the annual general meeting. In turn the organisations use the paper as an organisational tool, publicising their campaigns in its columns and using the face-to-face distribution network to spread their message and swell their ranks.

The national student press also regards itself as an "organisational tool in the progressive student movement" as one student editor put it.

Which is all very well: but what happens when a progressive organisation, (which is as fallible as any other) blunders? or is wracked by disputes? or falls out with another, equally "progressive" organisation (as regularly happens)? How does the alternative press handle that?

A student editor answers: "If an organisation held a meeting and the executive was split over the speaker, we would probably report on the meeting but not on the split. The minute you have defined your role, these issues become largely irrelevant. To the commercial press the controversy would be important. It is a way of discrediting the organisation. But if the organisation thinks it is important to cover, we will cover it."

A community writer agrees: "Our overriding priority is to create unity amongst the oppressed," she says.

But others cannot explain it away like this. They feel that the alternative press is ducking the problems thrown up by its own practice. Instead of reflecting the issues "the people" are debating, they either ignore them or lay down the line on a point at the centre of the controversy.

"This is a very difficult problem,"

acknowledges an Ukusa writer: "We have to examine ways of covering conflict between and within organisations in a way that is not destructive. This is part of the democracy we are aiming at."

Democracy, the key "Progressive" buzzword, throws up other problems as well. For example, how can democracy co-exist with deadlines? Especially if it means that all decisions have to be referred to all representatives of all participating organisations.

Grassroots has been grappling with that issue. It started out with a system in which every story was read out at a weekly news gathering meeting for comment. Two hours later people would begin to feel that their Saturday afternoons were at least as important as the commas and fullstops in a routine story. The system was labelled "demo-crazy", and a method of differentiation developed. Now only controversial stories, decisions about editorials and centrespreads are discussed at news gathering meetings. For the rest, decisions are taken and stories rewritten by the small core of full-time workers, who can (in theory) be called to account by the rest if the need arises — a very different form of organisation from a normal newspaper where the editor's word is final.

Community newspapers are also faced with the perennial language problem of this polyglot country. Ukusa, for example, is dual medium — English/Zulu. "We decided we had to write in Zulu in order to make ourselves more accessible to workers in the Durban area, but we met with some resistance from established readers (mostly Indians) who found it difficult to identify with the paper if they couldn't understand part of it. We are looking for imaginative ways to overcome this problem by having crisp introductions in the other language so that people at least know what it is about," said an Ukusa worker.

Imagination, in fact, is what a lot of community newspapers need more of. They are often accused of being boring, or reporting parochial campaigns in a similar format, week after week. Recently some have moved beyond bus shelters and washing lines to issues of national significance, such as the new constitutional proposals, "but we will have to do a lot more thinking of how to make our newspapers interesting and readable without falling into the commercial trap of

sensationalising news and events," says a community worker.

But the biggest problem the alternative press faces is financial. Each copy of Ukusa, for example, costs 40 cents to produce but sells at 10 cents. This means that fund-raising is every bit as important to these newspapers as news gathering. Considerable revenue is drawn from advertisements sold to small traders in the areas of circulation. The rest comes from donations, cake sales, ghoombas (as the reggae razzles are known), cabarets, concerts and donor subscriptions.

The alternative press is also called Prensa Chica – the "little Press" – after its South American counterpart. It is an appropriate name, for it is little – far too small to pose any significant threat to the "big" newspapers.

Yet the "little Press" may be winning a different kind of battle: For slowly in the townships of South Africa, a philosophy is taking root that is putting capitalism in the same league of swear-words as apartheid. ●

CSO: 3400/1893

## ARTICLE EXAMINES POSSIBILITY FOR NONVIOLENCE IN COUNTRY

Johannesburg FRONTLINE in English Sep 83 pp 28, 30-31

[Article by Gail Gerhart: "A Fresh Breath of Nonviolence"]

[Text]

**T**HERE'S a disturbing irony in the coincidence between the showing of Richard Attenborough's *Gandhi* and the transition of the guerilla war against South Africa in 1983 from a phase of sabotage into a new phase of eye-for-an-eye violence. Any thinking South African must come away from the film reflecting on how irreversibly the country is now moving away from Gandhi's vision and toward the abyss of racial war.

Change must come, but how? Critics of the present order, at least those who have seen *Gandhi*, will find it hard to duck the inevitable question: who is right? The proponents of a military solution, or Gandhi with his faith in the superiority of nonviolence? Is there a serious future for Gandhian tactics in a conflict which seems so irrevocably — in Bishop Tutu's phrase — "headed for the highjump"? These are questions which need to be asked with an open mind and not against the mental backdrop of misconceptions surrounding so-called "passive resistance" in South Africa in the past.

While no amount of mere speculation can prove the superior future potential of militant nonviolence in South African circumstances, it still may be useful to examine some common notions about why Gandhian resistance failed in the past and see if these notions hold up under scrutiny. My view is that they do not.

For example, take the frequent assertion that although Gandhi's methods may have succeeded in India, when South

Africans tried them in the 1950s they failed because the government's answer to nonviolence was violence. Let's hope the film will lay this important misconception to rest. To claim that violence on the part of a government can be a cause for the failure of nonviolence is to entirely miss the point of nonviolent resistance. Gandhian resisters always expected and prepared for violent retaliation. Their rejection of violence in the face of repression was what gave them the upper hand, by shifting the conflict to the ground where they had the advantage — the realm of moral power.

It is true that nonviolence failed in South Africa in the 1950s, but this was because the resistance movement lacked the strength to sustain campaigns in the face of government retaliation. Active popular support for the ANC was only sporadic. Rather than blaming the government we should examine the tactics and the will-power of some of the leaders of the anti-apartheid campaigns of that time. At the height of the 1952 Defiance Campaign, the president-general of the ANC dissociated himself from the rest of the ANC leadership on trial for resistance and made a special plea for clemency on the grounds that he had been a lifelong friend of the Afrikaners. His successor was a man who when banned from attending church, said he preferred to stay home rather than go without "permission". The militants of today say they are ready for the high costs of violence, but it seems that their predecessors were not ready for the far less

destructive costs of nonviolence. They borrowed the appearance of Gandhism but not its substance.

Let's take another common misconception, the one that says Gandhi succeeded in India because "passivity" is part of Indian culture. Never mind the Gurkhas and the Sikhs, just go to the film and then ask yourself whether Gandhi's tactics were "passive". Not only was Gandhi a fighter whose courage dwarfed that of his enemies, but he was a tactical fighter of consummate skill, alternately daring and patient as the circumstances demanded. It is true that like all great political leaders he tailored his ideology to the cultural world of his followers, but there was nothing culture-bound in his method. Martin Luther King adapted it to the very different circumstances of the American south. Creative adaptation is the key.

But didn't Gandhi always say that his methods depended on changing the hearts of the oppressors? Isn't that a foolish strategy in a country where the powers-that-be have proved time and again that violence is the only language they understand? This is another oversimplification that distorts the dynamics of Gandhian methods. Gandhi was under no illusion that the scales would suddenly fall from the eyes of his adversaries; his war, like any violent one, was a war of attrition. Militant, provocative nonviolence introduced the thin edge of the wedge of self-doubt into the psychic armour of the enemy. Careful media management was another prong of the attack. Mobilizing the maximum world attention in support of the resisters added embarrassment to the enemy's self-doubt. (How nicely Attenborough shows the nonplussed British viceroy at the time of the salt march suggesting to his aides that something be done to provoke Indian violence so the regime will appear justified in using massive counterforce. Arrest Gandhi perhaps?)

Little by little, under the pressure of many forces combined — world opinion, self-doubt, the high cost of repression, and the stubborn refusal of Indians to co-operate in their own subjugation — the smug overlords of the British raj underwent a change. Not so much a change of heart, which suggests an abdication of

one's self-interest in deference to other's interests, but a change of perception, a re-definition of self-interest, a re-orientation of goals which brought them into step with the world of their day. "But we are not an alien power," huffs a British official of the 1930s in *Gandhi*. "India is British!" Little by little, Gandhi exposed this Big Lie to the light until even the most myopic imperial die-hard was forced to acknowledge its error.

But doesn't nonviolence imply that the conflict will take a long time to work itself out? And in the meantime, isn't it true that the ruthlessness of the government has really left blacks no choice as to methods? To this, Gandhians would point out that political realists always plan their actions in a long time perspective. Biko did that, so does the ANC; nonviolent strategies are no different in that respect. More debatable is the question of whether blacks have a choice of methods. Is violence really "the only language they understand," — or is it just the only language that a lot of apartheid's angry victims find simple enough to speak? If Magnus Malan believes that South Africa's problems are only "20% military" and all the rest is a struggle for minds-and-hearts, maybe he knows something that his adversaries should weigh more heavily: that only a small percentage of South Africa's population is likely in the foreseeable future to be directly involved in violent action. How much the regime will have to spend, in effort, money, and manpower, to deal with *all the rest* is a question which is not only unanswered but also often unasked. Some people say that whites are driving blacks to violence, the suggestion being that this phenomenon is somehow involuntary rather than a matter of rational choice for blacks. But the situation isn't one of "no choice". Rather it is one of many options where the burden is on the proponents of change to perceive the range of potential choices available. These other choices are waiting to be discovered, invented, and tested, to see how blacks can maximize their position of advantage and confront the regime on territory where its weaknesses can be most readily exploited. "Politics," it is said, "is the art of the possible." But as *Gandhi* amply shows, politics in the hands of skillful strategists can also be the art of the seemingly impossible.

Isn't it true, though, that Gandhian methods can work only if a charismatic leader like Gandhi himself is present? In South Africa doesn't the regime simply eliminate any black leader it sees as a threat? Taking the second problem first, this is of course to be expected to some extent, though leaders who choose violence can reasonably anticipate having a higher fall-out rate than those who reject it. The more interesting question is the first one, however: is charismatic leadership a necessary condition of successful nonviolent resistance? Do leaders make movements, or do movements by their own momentum take men and women of talent and make them leaders, lieutenants of an idea whose time has come? The question answers itself if the early stages of later-successful movements are examined; every journey of a thousand miles started somewhere with a single step. And the step was always taken by people whom nobody regarded as "leaders". In Montgomery, Alabama, it started in 1955 when a black seamstress named Rosa Parks refused a busdriver's command to give up her seat to a white man. In Gandhi's case, being thrown unceremoniously off a Pretoria-bound train in 1893 had a similar effect. By the time a movement has grown strong enough to become widely known, the tendency is for the media to identify it with its prominent personalities — but by this time its very strength indicates that it has fostered reserves of talent that can be tapped even if top personalities become "guests of the government".

Without having produced a single black leader specifically identified with philosophical nonviolence, South Africa is nevertheless much further down the road to favourable conditions for Gandhian resistance than India was at the time Gandhi began his "experiments with truth". Gandhi had to devote many years to awakening the Indian masses to a

realization of the indignity and injustice of their own condition. In South Africa, much of that battle was fought in the 1960s and 1970s and is already over. Very large numbers of South Africans already know that their country is living a lie. All they lack is means of dealing with that lie effectively.

But isn't that the whole problem: what means are likely to achieve change? And isn't it clear on purely practical grounds that violence is most likely to achieve it? No, on both counts; not necessarily, the Gandhians would argue. First, it is anything but practical to think that the South African state is going to throw in the towel even if a hundred car bombs explode in downtown Pretoria. Its response — and it will appear to many to be quite a justified response — will be to play eye-for-an-eye, or more likely ten-eyes-for-one. This is a game where it holds most of the trumps. But the dubious practicality of violence (if practicality can be measured in cost-benefit ratios) isn't the only reason to re-examine the relationship between violence and change. The other reason is that change as such *isn't* the whole problem. Equally important in the long run is what kind of change occurs, and what kind of society emerges from the South African conflict. Will it be a society where fears and hatreds still fester, or one which can move forward in a spirit of reconciliation? Here is where Gandhi's philosophy of the continuity of means and ends is most profound, and where the statesmen begin to be sorted out from the politicians of lesser vision. South Africans of the more statesmanlike kind have been making the same point for years. But perhaps with an assist from Attenborough and *Gandhi* the message has found a new medium and thereby a new means to spark political inspiration.



BARLOWCAD SYSTEMS COMPUTERVISION

Johannesburg THE STAR in English 7 Sep 83 p 17M

[Text] Barlow Computer Aided Design (BarlowCad), distributor of Computervision computer aided design and manufacturing (CAD/CAM) designer systems in South Africa, is introducing a new Computervision corporate strategy.

This provides increased capabilities at the high end multi-application corporate user environment, through a contract with IBM.

In addition, increased capabilities are provided at the low end single user environment through a contract with Sun Microsystems of the US and acquisition of some US and European software houses.

The products to be announced as a result of these developments will round off the Computervision product line, providing solutions for all segments of the market from the smallest to the largest user.

The first element of the corporate strategy is the announcement of a contract between Computervision and IBM under which Computervision will acquire certain IBM hardware and software components for integration into its CAD/CAM systems.

The decision to integrate IBM architecture with existing and future products has been made to accommodate the needs of a rapidly evolving market.

In the fledgling years of the CAD/CAM industry, the minicomputer companies were unwilling to adapt their processors to the needs of graphics processing, so Computervision decided to develop its own functionally distributed processors and integrate these with other standard parts into its tuned CAD/CAM systems.

Today there is need to expand functionality, especially in data base management. Computervision has decided to meet these requirements with products developed by IBM.

Computervision will integrate IBM technology with its systems, add substantial hardware and software value, and sell these systems to customers needing sophisticated CAD/CAM data management capabilities.

Computervision has also entered an agreement with Sun Microsystems to develop jointly a family of intelligent graphics workstations for the single-user.

Intelligent workstations bring the benefits of CAD/CAM technology to engineers and designers, individually or in a network. Computervision has also strengthened its internal proprietary developments and acquired some software firms to provide key applications technology.

Cambridge Interactive Systems of the UK and CRADO of West Germany provide products which serve single-user, focused application markets; and the US-based Organisation for Industrial Research provides group technology software--a key element in product data management.

Computervision is represented in South Africa by BarlowCad a member of the Barlow Data group.

BarlowCad will shortly make announcements related to the Computervision agreements, while continuing to offer a turnkey solution to customers.

CSO: 3400/1925

UPSURGE IN STUDENT DETENTIONS NOTED

Johannesburg RAND DAILY MAIL in English 9 Sep 83 p 2

[Article by Helen Zampetakis and Anton Harber]

[Text] THERE had been an upsurge of student detentions at the University of the Witwatersrand this year because of increased political activity countrywide.

The chairman of the Wits Students' Representative Council, Mr Brendan Barry, made that comment yesterday in reaction to the detention of Miss Catherine Bernadette Hunter, 23.

The South African Police confirmed yesterday that Miss Hunter had been detained on Tuesday in terms of Section 29 of the Internal Security Act.

Miss Hunter, the 15th Wits student to be detained this year, is a member of the National Education Union of South Africa and a second-year BA student. She is also a member of the Young Christian Students' national team.

Mr Barry said yesterday the students who had been detained this year fell predominantly into two groups--black consciousness students and students committed to "church structures in opposition to apartheid".

Mr Carl Niehaus, a BA student who has been in detention since August 23, was also a member of the YCS and planned to become a minister in the NG Sendingkerk.

Mr Niehaus was detained in a Security Police swoop on student houses in Yeoville and Mayfair. His fiancée, Miss Jansie Lourens, who was arrested with him and their house-mates, has also not yet been released from detention.

"The detentions appear to be part of a larger crackdown by police on students committed to active opposition to apartheid.

"The State has been paying more attention to students this year, and it seems to be associated with increased political activity on a national level," Mr Barry said.

He cited student involvement in the formation of the United Democratic Front, the Transvaal Indian Congress, and various community-based resistance movements.

He referred to, among others, two Wits students who were detained apparently in connection with the erection of tents to house the Kliptown homeless.

And three other Wits students who were members of the Azanian Students' Movement (AZASM) were detained this month.

They were Mr Ahmet Joomah, head of the education secretariat of AZASM, Mr Gary Moonsamy, and a man identified only as "Salim".

Other students detained this year include:

--Members of Azaso: Mr Tiego Mosoneke, Mr Bogoso Mogale, and Mr Lazarus Mphasane detained last month.

--Mr Darryl Glaser, Mr Robert Whitecross, Mr Tom Wasp, and Mr Gavin Evans.

--The West Rand Security Police detained Miss Nazira Vahed, Mr Karina Naidoo, Miss Sheeroz Saleh, Mr Goolam Gatoo, and Mr Haroon Timol earlier this month.

CSO: 3400/1925

## BEHIND SCENES VIEW OF SQUATTERS FIGHTS GIVEN

Johannesburg FRONTLINE in English Sep 83 pp 42-43

[Article by Helen Zille: "Struggles Within Struggles"]

[Text] **T**HE squatter struggles that have become an annual feature of the Cape winter appear for all the world as a clearcut confrontation between the authorities and those who oppose the harassment of the homeless.

But that view obscures the intense debates and divisions that go on behind the newspaper pictures and headlines – debates that extend far beyond the squatter issue and are becoming as important for the politics of opposition as the conflicts between Mr P.W. Botha and Dr Andries Treurnicht are within the corridors of power.

The issue at stake is the tactics, strategies and goals of resistance – and the average person who gets roused enough to attend a protest meeting or donate a blanket is unlikely to know much about it. Nor is the average squatter when he arrives with his family and plastic garbage bags to build his shelter on the dunes outside Cape Town. But within days he is certain to know that his struggle is not a straightforward, bitter battle against officials determined to destroy his building material.

Willy-nilly, he becomes central to the debate on *how* that battle should be waged. Since Crossroads, this struggle within a struggle has become a central feature of Cape Town's squatter sagas. Yet it is a story that remains untold as the outside world focuses on the visible violence and its victims.

For many, perhaps for most South Africans, Crossroads is one of South Africa's very few symbols of successful resistance by a threatened, rightless com-

munity. Not only did the government back away from its decision to bulldoze the shantytown, but it agreed to grant urban residence rights and proper houses to thousands.

For others it was a short-term concession that contained the seed of a serious setback in the broader fight for freedom of movement and proper housing. They believe Koornhof gained more than he gave: By singling out the select few at Crossroads for special attention he successfully isolated them from others fighting similar battles who had to endure the other side of the deal – harsher implementation of the pass laws.

Instead of building up their own resources and gaining a deeper understanding of their position and the nature of their struggle, the Crossroads squatters were left idolising Dr Koornhof and dependent on lawyers and community workers to take up their battles for them.

The Nyanga Bush struggle that followed Crossroads differed in detail but polarised around the same broad issues. Two opposing groups whose only point of agreement was concern for the squatters, took on the government and each other in what quickly became a triangular struggle.

Their many differences are rooted in a deep ideological cleavage. One grouping, that calls itself "progressive" (with a small p to distinguish it very clearly from the old Progressive Party) regards apartheid as a functional part of the capitalist system and aims to eradicate both. These "progressives" regard one-man-one-vote as "a partial and insufficient democracy".



The economy too must be "democratic", as progressive terminology has it, which means "the people" must own and control the factories, farms and mines they work. Simply put, "progressive" is a synonym for Socialist. They draw their support from some unions, civic, youth and women's organisations, that often have as many differences amongst themselves as they do with those they deprecatingly call "Reformists".

"Reformists" haven't really got a name for themselves because they are such a disparate group. Some are clearly apolitical, and haven't any idea of the different ideological perspectives or the wider issues. They get involved simply because they can't stand by while others suffer. Others in the "Reformist" camp are strongly politicised, believing that a just order can be built on liberal principles of a non-racial Parliamentary democracy within a capitalist economy. They draw their strength from the ranks of Parliamentary opposition supporters, the established churches and welfare organisations.

These ideological divisions are reflected in different theories about organisation and resistance. And there is no doubt that in the Nyanga Bush struggle the "Reformist" strategy won out.

Soup and blankets, lawyers, prayers, petitions and delegations - these were the things the churches and welfare organisations had the resources, time and manpower to provide. And in their situation of severe deprivation, these were the things the people chose above amorphous progressive concepts like "mass struggle" or "building the unity of the working class".

Or so it seemed. But there are those who ask whether it wasn't primarily the squatters' committee that benefitted from the material support, entrenching its power of patronage as the distribution agents of welfare? Did the squatters support the committee or were they the unwilling victims at the bottom of the power hierarchy, buying the blankets that well-meaning outsiders had donated to their leaders?

Were the squatters involved in planning resistance campaigns or were they expected to act out their parts in a script they had no part in writing? When they arrived at the Cathedral to pray, did they know they would be staying to fast?

There are no clear answers to these

questions. What is clear, however, is that before long there were two committees in the Nyanga Bush struggle, one that worked with the progressives and one that didn't. And that each accused the other of acting "undemocratically". It is also clear that the majority of squatters shied away from the overtly political message of the progressives who were represented by a "volunteer group" composed largely of township youth. The established "progressive organisations" were not directly involved because they did not put the squatter struggle high on the priority list.

The progressives may have lost out in Nyanga, but the people of Nyanga Bush are still there, divided as ever, but living in two separate tent camps on the dunes near Crossroads, waiting for Dr Koornhof to take a decision on their fate. They won no grand concessions in the Crossroads mould, but they have not been sent back to Transkei, which is at least viewed as a "second class victory".

Against this background, the most recent squatter struggle at KTC is particularly interesting. For the KTC committee was the first to send the clear message to churches and welfare organisations: Keep your distance. They did not want charity handouts, lawyers and petitions. They intended to retain control of their struggle, through united resistance and by building strong alliances primarily with "progressive" organisations. Where short-term relief was necessary, it would be used to promote rather than undermine community cohesion.

Within a short time the committee also stood accused of being "undemocratic" and dependent on outsiders for their strength and power. And the community became so divided that at one point there were three physically separate makeshift plastic settlements on the same half-acre of ground.

Instead of forging strong alliances with organisations in the wider community, the people of KTC ended up an isolated, divided group, their differences exploited and deepened by the authorities who offered sites to those with passes and ordered the rest to "go back where they came from".

Today those who have the right stamp in their passes are being moved to the proposed new township of Khayalitsha while those who don't are either in prison or wandering around various

townships like so many nomads. Some have returned to the site, making washing lines from the barbed wire coils that were laid to keep them out. They are more than a little bitter that since KTC's final days, when they sat through the night under spotlights in the rain, they have been essentially alone.

Some believe that the progressive organisations once more had other priorities (such as organising opposition to the government's constitutional proposals) and faded when the KTC battle got too demanding.

The organisations themselves dispute this. A member of a group that initially played a strong supportive role in the KTC struggle, said they pulled out when the squatters refused to unite.

"We did not want to work with a divided community. It would only have deepened the divisions," she said.

"Anyway, the legals didn't want to talk about politics. They said they were fighting for houses. They didn't want to demand rights for the illegals because they said that was too political."

"Eventually when we wanted to link up with the illegals again there were so many informers amongst the squatters that it became impossible to plan any action effectively. So we just kept out."

The post mortem on KTC has hardly begun. But the issues it threw up are squarely in the centre of the debate, not only in the context of squatter struggles, but in the growing number of arenas where organisations fighting the government find that they are themselves divided by an equally wide gulf. ●

## REVIVAL OF COPPER PRICES EXPECTED

Johannesburg MINING WEEK in English 31 Aug 83 pp 1, 3

[Article by Madden Cole]

[Text]

**A REVIVAL of copper prices is on the cards and there is general optimism in the industry, Mr Ivan Ogilvie, managing director of the SA Copper Development Association, told Mining Week.**

Mr Ogilvie was commenting on a recent review by a leading London stockbroking firm, Grieveson Grant which stated that the metal could be on one of its upward moves.

"Of course much will depend on what major customers will do but with the upswing expectations for 1984 — and if the Japanese started buying on a large scale — the market should revive."

According to the report, signs of copper revival which should be watched were a reopening of Newmont's recently acquired Pinto Valley mine or a resumption of operations by Noranda at its four mines which were currently on suspension.

These developments would imply a further increase in the demand for the metal, the report stated.

Mr Ogilvie said that over the past few months

the London Metal Exchange price for copper had remained fairly stable and showed comparatively slight price variations between 1 080 and 1 180 pounds a ton.

This was a higher average than the six months' average of last year.

"If the price rose above the 1 180 pound mark, it would indicate that a better market for copper could be expected."

Although from 1985 to 1987 only relatively small price increases are foreseen by the report, it predicts that a progressive squeeze on supplies should lead to an acceleration of price rises through to the 1990s.

"The squeeze or shortage of supplies has not been caused artificially by a cutback on production, but by a real and steadily growing demand for copper," Mr Ogilvie said.

"Fortunately our mines have maintained a

flexible production policy and will be able to keep pace with the growing demand."

Although SA producers generally had to contend with a fairly low grade of copper, the purity of the final product was of the highest in the world.

"The efficiency of the mining and refining operations has kept the SA industry among the leading producers of the world," Mr Ogilvie said.

"For this reason, SA producers did not have to stockpile because of the sustained demand for the high quality locally produced copper."

Although there was little difficulty in finding markets for virgin copper, problems were being experienced in the export of semis, namely rods and bars.

Mr Ogilvie attributes this to the large exports of high scrap which is

essential to the semis industry.

"Not only has the export market in the semis field been badly hit by the recession, but the lack of scrap could force the industry to resort to the use of expensive virgin copper."

This would further aggravate the competitiveness of the local products in the world market.

"Overseas governments are also paying generous subsidies to their semis industries which enables them to sell their products here for below our cost price."

Mr Ogilvie said that the export of scrap was of serious concern to the industry and suggested that some type of funding be set up to enable stockpiles of scrap to be retained in the country.

CSO: 3400/1918

## SOUTH AFRICA

### ENTERTAINERS, SPORTS BOYCOTT CRITICIZED

MB201906 Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 20 Sep 83 p 6

[Editorial: "Ashecan"]

[Text] Arthur Ashe, the former American tennis star, who earned quite a bit of "tainted" money when he played in South Africa in the 70's, is back on the anti-South African bandwagon.

This time he is spearheading a new international campaign to persuade entertainers and sportsmen to boycott Sun City.

The reason: It is a "creation of South Africa's apartheid system."

Ashe says the new pressure group, Athletes and Artists Against Apartheid, wants to "bring to the attention of people...that while sport is fairly integrated in South Africa, life off the field is still pretty much as it was.

"Secondly, that South Africa's homeland scheme has as its ultimate aim completely to disfranchise every Black South African."

Ashe, who opposes sporting links with South Africa and wants sportsmen here to renounce apartheid before they are allowed to play internationally, is not on record as having denounced that Russians for their shooting down of a South Korean airliner.

Nor is he on record as having denounced Russia for its invasion of Afghanistan.

Nor is he on record as having been against American participation in the Moscow Olympics.

Or against anything else that would sear the soul of any true liberal.

By being Black, and by having played in South Africa, he gives himself the right to revile us and to organise boycott movements against us.

All we can say is that he is a hypocrite as well as a pain in the rear.



Joining him in the new organisation is singer Harry Belafonte, who knows so much about South Africa that he can liken it to Hitler Germany.

That this is a favourite comparison used by Bishop Desmond Tutu, general secretary of the South African Council of Churches may be just coincidental.

In any event, it is disgustingly untrue.

The show business stars who attended a news conference at which the new organisation was launched included Tony Randall, Ossie Davis, Ruby Dee and Michael Moriarty.

So far as we know, none of them would have been invited to appear to Sun City.

Only Tony Randall has a following here, because of his TV shows. If he extended his boycott to these shows, we would not be any the worse off (thought his producers would be).

It never strikes these professed do-gooders that their actions are undemocratic, denying sportsmen and artists the opportunity to earn their livelihood to the best advantage.

To each of 15,000 top names in American entertainment and sport, the well-funded organisation intends to send a glossy package of anti-South African material containing a pledge form binding them "not to perform in South Africa until apartheid is fully dismantled."

"Low-key, low-pressure techniques" are to be used, with "vengeance" action left to 30 supporting bodies, including all of America's major Black organisations.

"Vengeance" means harassment and boycotts of those who perform or play at Sun City. So the boycott is a double one--against us and against the stars who come here.

No doubt Mr Sol Kerzner, who has organised million-dollar tennis and golf tournaments at Sun City, besides bringing out international stage stars, knows how best to counter this movement.

In any case, sources in the American entertainment industry doubt whether stars who have already performed in South Africa (actually Bophuthatswana) will heed the calls of the new organisation.

Whether they do or not, we condemn the organisation as a body bent on blackmail--and blackmail, for whatever reason, is deplorable.

Anti-South African groups have a selective indignation and double standards.

We say into the Ashcan with the lot of them.

CSO: 3400/1936

## BRIEFS

**RAJBANSI'S SAIC--THE** deproclamation of the residential constraints on Grey Street is the latest attempt by the South African State to inflate the position of Mr Rajbansi, their Viceroy in "Indian" politics. In the short term, this cannot fail, and Mr. Rajbansi and his unrepresentative SAIC, will gain in popularity at the cost of the Natal Indian Congress. But in the medium term, or sooner, people will begin to realize what a crude and cynical act it is. For the removal of the constraints on Grey Street is nothing to celebrate, and deserving of no gratitude. The State hath taken away, and the State hath given. The arbitrary and cruel Group Areas Act had begun to destroy the organic fabric of Grey Street, in exactly the same way it has done in so many other parts of this country. Were it not for Mr Rajbansi (and perhaps Mr Rajab as well) the inexorable process of social destruction would have continued, leading to the final dispersion of the Grey Street community. So should the "Indians" be grateful to their Viceroy? Alas, but no, they shouldn't. The fact of the matter is that Mr Rajbansi, for all his Vice-regal trappings--he held a garden party recently, at which the Administrator of Natal told the guests that "Indians" and Afrikaners were very similar in some ways, though not in others--remains his master's creature ("Mazeltov, Herr Professor--the Thing walks'") and will always speak with a voice other than his own. And the reversion to the normal that the deproclamation actually represents, is little less than a bribe and a distraction, designed to do nothing other than cosmeticize the image of Mr Rajbansi and his fellow "leaders" on the discredited and unrepresentative South African Indian Council. Meanwhile, back in Driefontein, the removals continue. The Grey Street reprieve--opportunistic, manipulative and purposefully divisive--leaves the Group Areas Act intact. [Text] [Johannesburg FRONTLINE in English Sep 83 p 34]

**TAILINGS BACKFILLING OPERATIONAL--**BACKFILLING with dewatered mine tailings, the latest concept in underground mine support is now part and parcel of operations at Anglo American's Free State Geduld gold mine. Exhaustive testing has shown that this innovative support, which compacts quickly and effectively and does not require bulkheads, will improve safety conditions in deeplevel mines by reducing the incidence of rockbursts, lead to far better fire control and increase ventilation efficiency. It also assists significantly in the ever-present mining problem of waste disposal. Joy manufacturing has been co-operating with Rock Mechanics Department of Anglo American--part of the Group's technical development services division--as far back as 1975 in a series of backfilling experiments. As a result Joy developed in South Africa

the Tailspinner system to handle and dewater the abrasive quartzitic fines from feed to the tailings dams. Two of these Tailspinner centrifuges are now operating at Free State Geduld and a further four are on order for the second phase of the project. [Text] [Johannesburg MINING WEEK in English 31 Aug 83 p 3]

**TVL AUTO WORKERS STRIKE--A STRIKE** by 500 workers over a pay dispute at a car parts factory in Pretoria has spread to major centres throughout the country. Workers at Autoplastic (Pty) Ltd in Rosslyn went on strike on Monday when negotiations for pay increases broke down. Yesterday, workers at the Autoplastic plants in Port Elizabeth and Cape Town downed tools and union officials believe Durban workers will strike next. The strike, involving about 1,000 workers, is threatening setbacks within the country's motor industry. It has already threatened production lines at the Sigma Car Manufacturing Company, a spokesman for Sigma said yesterday. Autoplastic supplied Sigma with car seat covers for some of their models. Supplies were delivered on a daily basis and unless the strike ended soon, production lines could come to a halt within 24 hours. The workers, who are all members of the National Allied Automobile Workers Union, demanded an interim pay increase of 15c an hour. They presently receive a minimum R1,23 an hour. A statement by Naawu yesterday said: "The stoppage is still continuing and was marked by a heavy police presence near the factory. Negotiations have resumed between management and the union in the presence of an official from the Industrial Council." [Text] [Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 14 Sep 83 p 14]

**AUTO WORKERS STRIKE ENDS--PORT ELIZABETH--**About 1 000 members of the National Automobile and Allied Workers Union (Naawu) who went on strike at three branches of a motor components company, Autoplastics, in Port Elizabeth, Pretoria and Cape Town returned to work yesterday. This was confirmed yesterday by Mr Roy Msiza, national organiser of Naawu in Pretoria, who said workers at the factories had received an across-the-board wage increase of 8cents an hour. The stoppage was believed to be the first in recent labour history where plants in several parts of the country owned by one company struck at the same time in support of wage demands. [Text] [Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 15 Sep 83 p 13]

**NATAL WATER SUPPLY--PRETORIA--**The water supply situation is still critical in Natal dams. There has been a slight decrease generally in the Transvaal, while dams in the Western and Eastern Cape have filled slightly, according to the Department of Environment Affairs. The figures record the state of dams throughout South Africa as at September 5, and compare the quantity of water they held with the week before and last year. In Natal, the Albert Falls and Chelmsford Dam remained steady at three and four percent respectively, of their capacity. The respective figures for last year were nine and 12 percent. The Midmar Dam, which was 71 percent full last year, dropped by one percent during the week to 18 percent. In the Transvaal, the Hartbeespoort Dam, which was also 71 percent full last year, dropped from 27 to 24 percent last week. In the Western Cape, where many dams are full, the average full capacity supply increased from 73 to 74 percent last week. [Text] [Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 14 Sep 83 p 2]

**TRANSVAAL NP CONGRESS**--THE Transvaal National Party congress ended yesterday with a unanimous vote of faith and confidence in the government's constitutional plans and backing for the referendum. The NP's former Chief Whip in Parliament, Mr Koos Potgieter of Brits, later summed up the congress spirit with: "Politics were again romantic and a joy." A spirit of support for the party's leadership prevailed throughout the two-day congress. Unlike congresses of the past 13 years when only a handful of delegates was present at the conclusion, the congress saw most of the 1250 registered delegates present right to the end. This NP congress will also be remembered for its searching criticism by delegates, displaying a positive spirit on various crucial issues. There was in fact not a single negative voice at the two-day congress. At the Prime Minister's public meeting in Pretoria City Hall, attended by a record 2 500 audience, there were only positive interjections, so much so that Mr P W Botha agreed with every one of them. [Text] [Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 14 Sep 83 p 4]

**THOKOZA SCHOOL SPACE SHORTAGE**--OVER the past few years the population at schools has increased dramatically, and while in other areas this growth has been backed up with the provision of more school buildings, this has sadly not been the case in Thokoza. The school backlog has reached serious proportions. So much so that, in one instance, pupils from one secondary school have had to be accommodated in a local primary school. In some cases pupils have had to seek space in school at the neighbouring Katlehong. With only one high school operating in the area until early this year, local education authorities were faced with a problem allocating space to a flood of pupils who had passed their Standard Five. The only high school in the area, Thoko-Thaba, was out of question since its resources were stretched to a breaking point. This is, in a nutshell, how Landulwazi Secondary--a school without a building--came into existence. All those students who could not be accommodated in Thoko-Thaba--about 500 pupils--were allocated space in the local primary school. The principal of the "school without a building", Mr J M Ndlela, told Spotlight that the Department of Education and Training has promised to build a new 30-classroom school next year. The principal and his pupils would be housed in the new school probably by the end of next year. "We occupy 10 classrooms of Maphanzela. However, the Department has been helpful so far, supplying us with all the books needed," Mr Delela said. [Text] [Johannesburg SOWETAN in English 14 Sep 83 p 6]

**ECONOMIC ADVANCEMENT OF BLACKS**--BLACK advancement is a clear--if not the only--alternative to a dark road to poverty for every South African, Professor Jan Hupkes of the Unisa School of Business Leadership warned yesterday. "In stark reality, the choice (for South Africa) is between a greater integration and upliftment of the Black labour and management force, or eventually becoming poorer with the concomitant evils of unemployment and social unrest," he said. Speaking about the economics of Black advancement at a seminar in Johannesburg, Prof Hupkes said South Africa had, over the past four decades, achieved an average annual real gross domestic product growth of 4,5 percent. He believed a 2,5 percent growth rate would be likely in years to come. "A new growth stimulus must be developed if the South African economy is not to slowly sink in the quagmire of no per capita growth," Prof Hupkes said. "And it is here that Black advancement presents itself as a clear, if not the only,



alternative to the dark road to poverty for every South African." There were two ways in which Black advancement could become an instrument for economic growth. The existing inefficient use of Black labour and management had to be eliminated for the economy to move closer to the frontier of its production possibilities. And higher productivity also had to be stimulated by additional education, training and retraining and to help control inflation, Prof Hupkes said. [Text] [Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 14 Sep 83 p 8]

**BUS BOYCOTT IMPACT--GOMPO** Bus Company, a subsidiary of the Ciskei Transport Corporation (CTC), has sold 74 buses and is to retrench 330 workers because of losses suffered as a result of the bus boycott. Mr Hans Kaiser, managing director of the CTC announced on Monday morning that 30 percent of the workforce was to be retrenched and 31 percent of the company's bus fleet was to be sold. It is reliably understood that the company has lost over R2-million in lost revenue and damage to buses since the boycott began on July 17. Two weeks ago some 800 workers at Gompo were put on short time, working one week on, and one week off. Mr Kaiser said the company had tried everything possible to prevent this drastic action, but even a reduction of fares had had no effect whatsoever on the boycott. There appears to be no end in sight to one of South Africa's longest bus boycotts. And commuters have vowed not to use the buses because of the large number of deaths and detentions of people after clashes with the Ciskei police. And in a statement issued in Johannesburg Saawu's national secretary, Mr Herbert Barnabas has confirmed that the union would approach lawyers this week to discuss legal action against the banning in the Ciskei. The action is based on claims that the union is related to the bus boycott in Mdantsane, although Saawu has denied that it organised the boycott which is now in its ninth week. [Text] [Johannesburg SOWETAN in English 14 Sep 83 p 2]

**KRUGERRANDS FOR TAIWAN--HONG KONG--**International gold corp (Intergold) plans to begin selling Krugerrand gold coins in Taiwan on September 26, the company's coin division's South East Asia regional manager, Joseph Lo, told Reuters. Asia giant International Co, a wholly owned subsidiary of the semi-official China Trade and Development Co, will be the agent. Lo said that, initially, business, projected at 1 000 ounces a month, would be limited to a selling point in the departure area of the Chiang Kaichek Airport. [Text] [Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 14 Sep 83 p 25]

**VENDA CONTACTS--THOHoyANDOU--**In the face of negative attitudes, the "independent" homeland of Venda had made contacts with foreign countries, Venda's President P R Mphephu, claimed yesterday. He was speaking in Thohoyandou during celebrations of the tiny homeland's fourth anniversary of own rule, granted by the South African government on September 13, 1979. He said a well-balanced, sustained economic growth had been pursued during the past four years. [Text] [Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 14 Sep 83 p 25]

**BOPHUTHATSWANA DIAMONDS TEST--**Rio Tinto Group subsidiary Mafikeng Diamonds said in Johannesburg yesterday that it is conducting a test mining operation on an alluvial diamonds deposit in Bophuthatswana, about 10 km from Mafikeng. A full year of operation will be required before the distribution and value of the diamonds in the low-grade deposit can be confirmed, but Mafikeng Diamonds



said it is hopeful that modern recovery methods applied on a larger scale than previously practised will justify a long-term mining operation. The mine, managed by Rio Tinto South Africa, began operations in June after a construction cost of R5-million with a planned daily throughput of 1 300 tons of gravel. [Text] [Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 14 Sep 83 p 25]

STANGER INDIANS--THE Indian community of Stanger has welcomed the Government's decision to leave Shakaville to blacks. Mr Ismail Moolla, community leader and member of the Indian Council, said there had been a lot of tension between the two groups until the area was zoned for blacks. "It was believed that the Indian community wanted the land for housing and factories. We did not have any designs on Shakaville and made this clear, but the tension existed. We even made representations to the Government to this effect," said Mr Moolla. Now that Shakaville would remain black, Mr Moolla said, Indian leaders would meet their black counterparts to form a committee to upgrade the area. "There is a lot that needs to be done there and we intend to help as much as we can. Priorities will be essential services like water, sanitation and power," said Mr Moolla. He said tension began when houses and factories were built on the boundary of Shakaville and blacks feared the entire area would be rezoned. A black leader, Mr Simone Goba, said Shakaville had great historical importance for the Zulu nation. "There are many historical relics from King Shaka's era still there, such as his favourite bathing area, his hunting grounds and remains of his huts, which form a great part of our past," said Mr Goba. [Text] [Durban THE DAILY NEWS in English 5 Sep 83 p 5]

HUHUDI REMOVALS--THE Huhudi Community Council has invited the Huhudi Civic Association (HUCA) to a meeting to discuss the removal of Vryburg blacks to Bophuthatswana. Mr J M Dikole chairman of the Huhudi Community Council said he had invited officials of HUCA so that they could discuss the latest developments in regard to the removals. Some of the Huhudi people had already been moved to Pudimoe, a small town near Taung, from where they commuted daily to Vryburg. HUCA officials have, however, indicated that they would only talk to the officials of the council in their capacity of residents and not as councillors. Mr Goatshotsemang Galeng, chairman of HUCA, said: 'We cannot speak to them in their capacity of councillors because we do not recognise the council. We in HUCA fail to understand why they choose to see us as a body and to discuss removals, for that matter--they are part of the structure that threatens us with removals,' said Mr Galeng. [Text] [Kimberley DIAMOND FIELDS ADVERTISER in English 2 Sep 83 p 4]

BOILERMAKERS SLAM TUCSA--The oldest established trade union federation in the country, the Trade Union Council of South Africa (Tucsa), has been accused of being in "a donga" and of losing credibility because it is not adapting fast enough to changing labour circumstances. This is the claim of the general secretary of the SA Boilermakers' Society, Mr Ike van der Watt, in the most recent issue of the union newsletter, Crucible. The criticism comes just before the council's 29th annual conference in Port Elizabeth next month. In a scathing attack on Tucsa, to which the boilermakers are affiliated, Mr. van der Watt says not only is Tucsa in a rut but indications are that certain affiliates seem willing to stay there. "In my view Tucsa has lost its flexibility. The decline began with the Government's acceptance of the main

recommendations of the Wiehaha Commission. To a large extent the subsequent legislation satisfied the aspirations which had kept Tucsa alive and significant through the years and the federation lost its objectives and much of its motivating power," he states. The federation's next step should be a move towards co-operation in the whole of the trade union movement. "Tucsa will have to create dialogue with a wide range of trade unions. By that I mean all trade unions, not only those which will accept approaches from Tucsa without too much resistance. A lot of spadework needs to be done and very flexible strategies will have to be followed," says Mr van der Watt. The boilermakers had been criticised by other affiliates for making contact outside the ranks "but I see no reason why contact with unions outside Tucsa should necessarily cause conflict," said Mr van der Watt. Avoiding conflict, confrontation and debate just for the sake of artificial peace would lead only to stagnation of the council or an ultimate split. Resolutions which the boilermakers have put forward for debate at the Tucsa conference cover the continued relevance of the council, influx control and the Orderly Movement and Settlement of Black Persons Bill, commercial education, works councils, housing and maternity leave. [Text] [Johannesburg THE STAR in English 7 Sep 83 p 7M]

OFFICE SPACE SURPLUS--The South African commercial property market is becoming increasingly competitive and with a build-up of office space in all major cities certain as new projects come on stream, landlords have cut rentals by 10 to 20 percent. On the other hand the investment sector, heavily influenced by the weight of institutional funds and privately-held ready cash, remains buoyant but few good investment opportunities are available to satisfy demand. These points emerge from a review of the market by property economists, J H Isaacs, which foresees developers facing competitive conditions for the next year to 18 months. "Retail space in city centres and major shopping complexes remains generally fully let, but demand for such accommodation has reduced," says JHI. "Turnovers in this sector are down across the board and landlords' expectations for bonus rents related to turnover have been adjusted downwards markedly." On the industrial market, the company sees a "general dipping of rents by an average of 15 percent" and believes they could go even lower. An indication of the downturn in the residential rental market is also seen in the fact that homes and apartments in luxury areas with rents of R650 a month and more are much more freely available. It's a boom time for investments, tough--if you can find them. Prime properties are almost impossible to obtain and the few that materialise are "snapped up overnight by anxious investors". [Text] [Johannesburg THE STAR in English 7 Sep 83 p 15M]

MISSILE-TESTING RANGE--WITH everything that's been said and written on the De Hoop issue, there's a possible danger that the principle at the heart of the matter could be obscured. To begin with, it is not easy to define this principle. There are too many abstract things involved, like a man's spiritual and emotional attachment to the land, how it shapes his thinking and character, how it nurtures patriotism and affects the quality of life and what values he passes on to future generations. We sing about it in our national anthem. It is the spirit of South Africa. It is continuity. And the places where this spirit dwells are the wild, natural places. This is why all civilized countries proclaim wildlife areas, national parks and nature reserves and why they are regarded with special respect and reverence. The very idea

of Armscor turning De Hoop into a missile testing range negates that reverence and degrades the principle. If Armscor uses a proclaimed nature reserve in this manner what kind of precedent will it set? What values will it uphold? If a unique and proclaimed nature area can be treated so cheaply, what is the point of creating new nature reserves? What is the point of any conservation at all? Who will donate money and give or sell land for new nature reserves when those who should care treat the established ones as if they have no meaning or claim to exist. Nothing will be sacred any more and an ethic of inestimable worth will be trampled upon. [Text] [Cape Town THE CAPE TIMES in English 2 Sep 83 p 9]

FIRST LASER PRINTER--Affiliated Computing Services recently became the first commercial laser printing bureau in South Africa when the company installed a Xerox 9700 electronic printing system. The 9700 prints at a rate of 18 000 lines a minute, or two pages a second, with output quality comparable to conventional offset printing. [Text] [Johannesburg THE STAR in English 7 Sep 83 p 17M]

MICRO FCS PACKAGE--Barlowmicro has expanded the software package for the recently-launched Fortune 32-bit microcomputer. The package is Decision Information's Micro FCS, a financial modelling programme based on the company's FCS-EPS mainframe planning system. Decision Information director, Ms Jacqueline Lauder, says Micro FCS is aimed at the more complex larger company applications--designed to provide managers in sales, marketing, finance or production with a relatively low-cost desk-top entry into planning. It offers facilities--like sophisticated consolidation and logic command features--usually associated with much larger systems. The most striking feature of the Fortune 32:16/FCS marriage is the mainframe-like calculating speed provided by Fortune's advanced Unix operating system, says Ms Lauder. "This, together with 5, 10 or 20 Mbyte hard disk capacity options, allows fast, on-line accessibility to any number of large, integrated modules." Ms Lauder believes Micro FCS on the Fortune 32:16, with its multi-user, multi-tasking capabilities, to be most attractive to companies that need a more powerful system to handle major budgeting, consolidation or manpower projects, along with other regular computing activities. [Text] [Johannesburg THE STAR in English 7 Sep 83 p 17M]

PRETORIA PARKS RULING HIT--The former head of military intelligence in the SADF, Lieutenant General H du Toit, last night criticised the closing of Pretoria's parks to blacks and called it an example of negative form of national strategy. Although General du Toit said he did not believe a charter of human rights could be implemented in South Africa at present, a scaled-down version of such a charter, like a law banning anything which could lead to racial friction, should be investigated. Delivering the ninth H F Verwoerd memorial address for the SA Bureau for Racial Affairs (Sabra) to commemorate Dr Verwoerd's birthday, General du Toit said: "As a born Pretorian I am not proud of my city's decision to close its parks to blacks. Realism and rationality played no role in the manner in which this matter was handled." The retired general, now a professor of strategic studies at the Rand Afrikaans University, spoke about the need for: --Afrikaner unity and the fact that South Africa's national spirit could not be mobilised properly unless Afrikaner

unity formed an important part of it. --A national strategy to counter real threats. --Development of black homelands in the interests of national security. After paying his respects to Dr Verwoerd, General du Toit said South Africa's policy of separate development on ethnic grounds was correct in principle and had been so successfully implemented that no government would succeed in undoing it. General du Toit urged Sabra to do more for urban blacks because over the years the impression had been created that Sabra worked only for whites. Sabra should extend practical aid to urban blacks who experienced problems with the confusing bureaucracy which ruled their lives, he said.  
[Text] [Johannesburg THE STAR in English 7 Sep 83 p 1]

CSO: 3400/1925



ASSESSMENT OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS, FUTURE OPPORTUNITIES

Bonn AFRIKA-POST in German Aug 83 pp 3-5

[Article by Herbert Schroeder: "Zimbabwe Three Years Later"]

[Text] Zimbabwe of 1983 looks different from that of 1980. The founding father Nkomo is outside the country. Nonalignment is in doubt. But its Afro-European integration potential remains a hope.

Zimbabwe's third birthday on 19 April was no occasion for worldwide jubilation. Cecil Rhodes heritage, the third largest economic power of Africa, the model of racial reconciliation, the country from which Black Africa's renaissance was to originate--and whatever other premature praises may have been paid to the country--has just about made it. But the country has not been able to fulfill the great expectations that had been placed in it everywhere--not least in Africa itself.

Not yet?--Perhaps. Three years are presumably too short a time to make a final judgment. But it would hardly do justice to the situation if the observation were made that the first birthday was celebrated in Salisbury, the second in Harare, but the third only in Pretoria.

Zimbabwe's patriarch Nkomo who lives in his temporary London exile--at the Hyde Park corner in the immediate vicinity of the soapbox orators--while his family, except for his wife, is in protective custody. Very little has been heard from him, only that he insists on a role in Zimbabwe because without him nothing can happen. But since he cannot achieve anything with the ballot, there is nothing left to him but the use of force.

A black UDI, a Savimbi of Zimbabwe? Or after all a new reconciliation with Mugabe? However, the latter ignored him during his stay in London on the way back from his East Europe travel. Is it possible that history has already passed over Nkomo? His biggest mistake is likely to have been that he rejected the office of state president offered to him.



It can only be repeated again and again: what is involved in all this is less of a party strife than, in the first place, a power struggle between two strong personalities with an ethnic background which actually should be a thing of the past. For the two parties, Zanu and Zapu, are not facing each other as government and opposition, but they are a coalition even though they are involved in a confrontation of their leading representatives. Even today Nkomo's Zapu has seven seats in the cabinet, four of them important ones.

Neither party is clearly oriented either ideologically or tactically. One only has to think of one of Nkomo's main opponents in government and Zanu, who is a Ndebele. Both parties include "Chinese" and "Russians," if one wishes to use that as a characteristic for differentiation. Both have moderate and radical wings.

In Zapu there is a group around Nkomo's deputy, Josiah Chinamano, who does not appear to be opposed to a unity party and the militant camp around Dumiso Dabengwa and Lookout Masuku (married to an East German woman), Zipra leaders trained in the East who do not trust their own party an inch. Together with four others, both of them were recently acquitted in a trial for illegal stockpiling of weapons and subversive ties with Moscow's KGB, but were immediately rearrested.

Nkomo himself, above all else does not want to regard himself solely as a Matabele representative. For that would limit him for all times to the role of a provincial chief and to the 20 of the 100 seats in parliament that he received in the first elections. His goal is power in the entire country. But it is difficult to recognize wherein the two parties could differ in the future as regards development and path of the country. Their existence really can only be explained from history and personalities and is nearly a luxury.

However, the Lancaster House Agreement established both of them as well as the 20 deputies of the whites until 1987 and Zimbabwe will have to live with that. Premature change would be possible only with an impossible-to-achieve unanimity or by a violation of the constitution. Even the new elections due in 1985, which Mugabe had intended to have the function of a plebiscite on the one-party system, will not be able to change anything in this situation.

Nkomo's absence has again made possible conciliatory talks on the topic of a fusion of Zapu and Zanu into a "super-Zanu." Zvogbo, minister of constitutional affairs, described these

talks in the press clearly as "preparatory talks," not negotiations, but on the Zanu side such powerful personalities as the security minister Emmerson Munangagwa participated in the talks and on the Zapu side, now weak in leadership, Nkomo's deputy, Chinamano. The chances for success are difficult to judge without the main figure. Many are alleged to have switched from the Zapu to the Zanu. At the end, a breakup of the Zapu could be a possibility.

On the positive side, the campaign of the Fifth Brigade in Matabeleland and reminiscent of the horrors of the Zulu wars, which had such a detrimental effect on Zimbabwe's good image, has come to an end in the meantime. It would have been desirable for the government to have reacted with a little more sensitivity to the aroused world opinion than the brusque rejection of the well founded charges made by the bishops who were dismissed as "hypocritical prelates" or the prime minister's absence during the parliamentary debate on the events. Reliable information on this sorry chapter, the guilty ones and its victims will probably never be known. The fact that during the past 14 months alone, 28 whites, men and women, including Senator Paul Savage, were murdered on their farms is eloquent enough.

London as well as Bonn have reacted with surprising composure. Then British Foreign Secretary Pym stated to the DAILY TELEGRAPH that it is understandable that the government must maintain its control over the country even with harsh means and that everything had been done only in reference to Matabeleland while there was complete peace and order in the other areas, and that there was even gratifying progress.

In Bonn, Minister of State Moellmann of the Foreign Office stated before the Federal Parliament on 19 May that the Federal Government had not hesitated to clearly remind the Zimbabwe government of its responsibility for respecting elementary human rights, a move that had been closely coordinated with its Western partners.

The government notes with satisfaction that the riots in Matabeleland ended a few weeks ago. He also said it appears necessary to point out that the events there were not an expression of a confrontation of whites and blacks there, but essentially a visible reaction, certainly not to be approved but discernible in its political background, against a systematically pursued policy of destabilization. He said Bonn had no indications that Prime Minister Mugabe wanted to endanger

parliamentary pluralism by means of the riots that occurred in Matabeleland.

Whichever way the matter is viewed, its core lies in the fact that a question was approached by use of force that could only be solved by political means. Certain outside destabilization attempts should not be denied--but undoubtedly there is also homemade destabilization. And the outside one can also have two sides, as the recent arrest of ANC insurgents, who attempted to infiltrate from Zimbabwe, at the South African border demonstrated. They had been trained in Angola and the GDR and merely passed through Zimbabwe in transit from Maputo, so that Pretoria did not blow up the matter out of proportion and was satisfied with Harare's explanation that it supports the ANC only within the OAU framework. If it were so minded, Pretoria has at its disposal the by far most effective destabilization instruments in the economic field.

The laboriously restored internal peace may be subjected to a new test in the near future by a just started trial before the Supreme Court against six high air force officers headed by Air Vice Marshal Hugh Slatter. The accused, some of whom have British as well as Zimbabwe citizenship, are charged with complicity in the plot against the Thornhill air force base on 25 July 1982, in which Zimbabwe lost one quarter of its air force. The accused, who have been under detention for 10 months, testified that their alleged confessions were extorted by severe tortures. The outcome of the trial will put Harare as well as London to a hard test.

It is not surprising that in this tension-laden domestic atmosphere, foreign policy is also being viewed under perhaps too polarizing aspects. Prime Minister Mugabe and four of his ministers in May followed up their big 1982 visit to the West, with a 12-day visit to Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and the GDR and Mugabe subsequently indicated that he may even go to Moscow this year. It would probably be going too far to assume a "change in alliances," for it is more likely to be a need to catch up in nonalignment. As is known, in 1980 the East to its displeasure was excluded from the peace negotiations arranged by the Commonwealth among its members despite massive military assistance by the East in the struggle for independence.

What is even more noteworthy is the fact that the countries visited were really "Nkomo territory" and the reception of Mugabe probably signaled that they have reached the conclusion that they can no longer count on their old preferred ally. Conversely, Mugabe can protect himself against the Nkomo followers as well as the radicals in his own party.

Especially stressed was the visit to the GDR which Mugabe had not even invited to the independence celebrations in 1980, but which now awarded him the Great Star of People's Friendship and made some false claims to them (Schwerin castle and the autobahn are said to have been sparkling as the work of socialist development). There was clearly talk of the friendship of the two parties, SED (Socialist Unity Party of Germany) and Zanu, but also three agreements were concluded between the two states on economic, scientific, and industrial cooperation. According to Mugabe, future relations are supposed to be "especially close" and Honecker accepted an invitation to Harare. But it is hardly to be assumed that Mugabe really intends to bet on the wrong horse from a developmental policy point of view.

The Western countries have calmly noted the foreign policy cosmetics as well as the Nkomo case. The IMF has granted Zimbabwe a new loan of \$ 384 million and the EC, aid amounting to DM 3.4 million. Furthermore, the representatives of the six most important donor countries have stated that their cooperation will continue unchanged. Also federal development minister Warnke's second Africa trip will take him to Zimbabwe and Zaire during the first half of August. Presumably not with empty hands after the project negotiations had first been interrupted in April on account of the situation.

Mugabe, too continues to back Western firms--such as even the South African Anglo-American Corporation and other mining companies to whom he recently gave loans amounting to 39 million S. dollars. The course continues toward partnerships instead of nationalizations, whereby, however, the majority ownership has now gone to the state in oil supply, transportation, and mill enterprises. But the economic situation, influenced also by the persistent drought, has worsened. A negative growth of 3 percent must be expected for 1983, while the 1982 growth was still plus 2-3 percent. During the first 9 months of 1982, the foreign trade balance registered a deficit of DM 500 million, twice as much as the year before.

Much has changed in Zimbabwe during the 3 years of independence. But it remains one of the most important countries of Africa and, if peace and security are maintained, a country with a future. However, the unsettled questions of 1980 have become even more urgent today. Is it going to continue its domestic policy of reconciliation and/or is it going to resume it? Is it going to maintain economic pragmatism? Is it going to know how to maintain its nonalignment? The degree to which Zimbabwe will be able to continue to play the role as an integration force that befits it not only within Africa but also between Africa and Europe will depend on convincing answers to these questions.



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